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INTRODUCTION
Sexual misconduct by lawyers has been a problem for their victims1
and for the legal profession. However, until 2002, there was no provision
in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
that dealt specifically with sexual behavior by lawyers.2 In that year, the

1. I mean to give “victims” a broad scope in this sentence—one that is not
limited to those who are injured by a lawyer’s sexually related criminal
misconduct. So, for example, a victim would include a client whose interests are
impaired as a result of a consensual sexual relationship with the lawyer.
2. In that year, on recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission, the
American Bar Association adopted Model Rule 1.8(j), which deals with sexual
relations between lawyers and clients. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Some states had previously adopted rules on
lawyer sexual misconduct. See, e.g., Christian F. Southwick, Ardor and
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American Bar Association added Model Rule 1.8(j), which states: “A
lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual
sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer
relationship commenced.”3
Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA’s rule, or its equivalent.4
As of this writing, however, Louisiana has not adopted the ABA rule. In
fact, no provision of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct
explicitly deals with sexual conduct by lawyers. But this does not mean
that the sexual conduct of Louisiana lawyers is unregulated. As it turns
out, a number of Louisiana lawyers have incurred professional discipline
for their sexually related behavior. Some have experienced other adverse
consequences.
Louisiana cases featuring sexual misconduct by lawyers have some
recurring themes, and variations on those themes. This Article identifies
them. It considers the extent to which the Louisiana disciplinary decisions
might have been different if Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect at the
relevant time.5 It also discusses what Louisiana could do going forward.
Part I of this Article discusses some background matters relating to the
promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j) and the Louisiana response to that
promulgation. Part II discusses the cases in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court has disciplined Louisiana lawyers for sexually related misconduct.
Part III considers whether Louisiana should revisit adoption of Model Rule
1.8(j) or take another approach to the issue of lawyer sexual misconduct.
The conclusion suggests some possible courses of action.

Advocacy: Attorney-Client Sexual Relations and the Regulatory Impulse in Texas
and across the Nation, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 321–22 (2002).
3. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
4. See Casey W. Baker, Attorney-Client Sexual Relationships in the #MeToo
Era: Understanding Current State Approaches and Working towards a Better
Rule, 49 SW. L. REV. 243, 253–57 (2020) (discussing approaches taken in
different jurisdictions); Hannah Thompson Stilley, Comment, Attorney-Client
Sexual Relationships: A Call for All States to Adopt Model Rule 1.8(j), 32 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 499, 512–25 (2020) (including a table showing different
approaches taken in different jurisdictions); see also Jurisdictional Rules
Comparison Charts, ABA CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts/ [https://perma.cc/S2XE-V
VPR] (last visited Aug. 13, 2020).
5. Louisiana courts decided some of the Louisiana cases before the 2002
promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j). Even so, it will be instructive to consider what
difference, if any, Model Rule 1.8(j) might have made if it had been promulgated
earlier and if Louisiana had adopted it. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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I. THE PROMULGATION OF MODEL RULE 1.8(J) AND THE LOUISIANA
RESPONSE
A. The Promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j)
In 2002, after considerable debate, the American Bar Association’s
House of Delegates adopted Model Rule 1.8(j).6 It provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual
sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer
relationship commenced.”7 Adoption had been recommended by the
Ethics 2000 Commission.8 A “Reporter’s Explanation of Changes”
characterized the change as a “new per se Rule prohibiting most clientlawyer sexual relationships.”9 The Reporter’s Explanation also identified
some reasons for the commission’s recommendation:
The Commission recommends following the lead of a number of
jurisdictions that have adopted Rules explicitly regulating clientlawyer sexual conduct. Although recognizing that most egregious
behavior of lawyers can be addressed through other Rules, the
Commission believes that such Rules may not be sufficient. Given
the number of complaints of lawyer sexual misconduct that have
been filed, the Commission believes that having a specific Rule
has the advantage not only of alerting lawyers more effectively to
the dangers of sexual relationships with clients but also of alerting
clients that the lawyer may have violated ethical obligations in
engaging in such conduct.10
The commission thought that the new rule would have an
informational role. The new rule would alert lawyers to the dangers of
sexual relationships with clients. Lawyers, thus alerted, presumably would
be better able to avoid those dangers. The new rule would also alert clients
to the existence of an ethical obligation that that their lawyers were
expected to observe. Clients, thus alerted, presumably would be better
6. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING §13.37
(4th ed. 2020); Baker, supra note 4, at 251 (noting that the proposed new rule was
controversial from its outset and mentioning efforts to defeat it).
7. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
8. See 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 6; Baker, supra note 4.
9. See Model Rule 1.8: Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, ABA ETHICS
2000 COMM’N (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule18rem/
[https://perma.cc/348T-AHR2] [hereinafter Reporter’s Explanation].
10. Id.
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informed about relevant professional obligations of their lawyers and be
in a better position to deal with violations, or impending violations, of
those obligations.
The Reporter’s Explanation also explained why the commission had
recommended a “total” ban:
The Commission further recommends a total, rather than a partial,
ban on client-lawyer relationships, except for those pre-dating the
formation of the client-lawyer relationship. Partial bans, i.e., those
that prohibit relationships only when they involve coercion or
cause the lawyer to act incompetently, do not effectively address
the problem of conflicts of interest, particularly the difficulty of
obtaining an adequately informed consent from the client.
Moreover, they do little to prevent problems from arising in the
first place.11
If certain conditions can be satisfied, some conflicts of interest can be
remedied by client consent.12 But this new rule, which became a subpart
of Rule 1.8—itself a conflict of interest rule—was not designed that way.
The ban, where it applies, is “total.”13 In the commission’s view, the total
ban would be more likely to prevent problems associated with lawyerclient sexual relationships than would a narrower prohibition that focused
only on particular evils to be avoided.
When the House of Delegates adopted 1.8(j), it also adopted some new
comments to Model Rule 1.8. One of the comments provides additional
information about the rationale for the rule and its non-consentable status:
The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in
which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and
confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a
sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair
exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary role, in violation of the
lawyer’s basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client
to the client’s disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship
presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer’s
emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the
client without impairment of the exercise of independent
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
13. Id. r. 1.8(j). “Notably, and unlike many rules governing the client-lawyer
relationship, Rule 1.8(j) cannot be obviated by the client’s informed consent. To
the extent that the problem is one of conflict of interest, in other words, the conflict
is ‘non-consentable.’” 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.37.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 99

4/26/21 8:53 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

772

[Vol. 81

professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the
professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to
predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the
attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are
protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context
of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger
of harm to client interests and because the client’s own emotional
involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate
informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having
sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship
is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the
client.14
The comment mentions two justifications for the rule that, as we will
see, have also been discussed in Louisiana cases involving sexual
misconduct by lawyers: exploitation of the client, contrary to fiduciary
obligations, and impairment of independent professional judgment. But it
also mentions concerns about protection of confidences—something that
has not, at least so far, received attention in Louisiana sexual misconduct
cases.
Model Rule 1.8(j) prohibits sexual relations between attorneys and
clients that arise after the formation of the attorney-client relationship. It
does not prohibit lawyers from representing persons with whom they
already have a sexual relationship. The problem, from the ABA’s
perspective, is not so much the sexual relations themselves, but the timing
of them. A comment to Model Rule 1.8 offers this explanation:
Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are
not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary
relationship and client dependency are diminished when the
sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the
client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the
representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider
whether the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be
materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).15

14. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
15. Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 18. The reference to Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) is to a provision
that defines a “concurrent conflict of interest” as one in which “there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Id. r. 1.7(a)(2).
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The comment indicates that even though there is not a total ban on the
representation of a client with whom the lawyer has a pre-existing sexual
relationship, there could still be a conflict of interest in the representation.
A conflict of interest could arise if, under the circumstances, the preexisting sexual relationship would materially limit the lawyer’s ability to
represent the client. In other words, even though Model Rule 1.8(j) would
not prohibit a lawyer from taking on the representation of a person with
whom the lawyer was having a sexual relationship, another rule might do
so.
One additional comment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
endeavors to apply the rule of 1.8(j) to the situation in which the client is
an organization, such as a corporation. The comment provides:
When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule
prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or
outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a
constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or
regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s
legal matters.16
The prohibition is narrowly drawn. It does not bar lawyers from
having sexual relationships with all constituents of the organization but
only with those who are charged with dealing with the lawyers on behalf
of the organization. Sexual relationships with those constituents could
impair the interests of the client-organization.
In light of the foregoing, and especially considering the rule’s focus
on the timing of sexual relations, no one should mistake Model Rule 1.8(j)
for a rule that attempts to prevent “immoral” conduct as such.17 Instead, it
aims to prevent breaches of fiduciary duty and impairment of the
representation that can arise when a lawyer engages in sexual relations
with an existing client.

16. Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 19.
17. Id. On a somewhat related point, a comment to Model Rule 8.4—the
“misconduct” rule—observes that one could construe the concept of “‘moral
turpitude’ . . . to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality,
such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to
fitness for the practice of law.” Id. r. 8.4 cmt. 2. The comment goes on to state:
“Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer
should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice.” Id.
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Some states had adopted rules on attorney-client sexual relationships
before the promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j).18 After the American Bar
Association promulgated Model Rule 1.8(j), additional states adopted
rules limiting lawyer-client sexual relations.19 A number of commentators
have called for the adoption of such rules.20 However, some commentators
have raised objections to Model Rule 1.8(j) or to the idea of imposing a
per se ban on sexual relations between lawyers and clients.21
B. The Louisiana Response
In 1999, the Louisiana State Bar Association established an Ethics
2000 Committee to monitor the work of the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission, to conduct a review of the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct, and to recommend changes to those rules.22 In its initial
18. See, e.g., Southwick, supra note 2, at 321; Florence Vincent, Regulating
Intimacy of Lawyers: Why Is It Needed and How Should It Be Approached?, 33
U. TOL. L. REV. 645, 672–73 (2002); Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual
Relations, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 131, 137–48 (1998).
19. See Baker, supra note 4, at 253–57 (discussing approaches taken in
different jurisdictions).
20. See, e.g., Frederick C. Moss & Patricia Chamblin, Lover vs. Lawyer: The
Sex with Clients Debate in Texas, 55 THE ADVOC. 48 (2011); Stilley, supra note
4; Carole J. Buckner & Robert K. Sall, Point/Counterpoint-Sex with Clients:
Prohibition or Permission?, 50 ORANGE CNTY LAW. MAG. 38 (2008),
https://sallspencer.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/February%202008%20%20Sex%20with%20Clients.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G4X-NJZ5]; see also Baker,
supra note 4, at 252 (saying that, although adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) was a
positive development, the rule can be improved); Awad, supra note 18, at 191
(“States should adopt express rules that prohibit attorney-client sexual relations
during representation.”); Margit Livingston, When Libido Subverts Credo:
Regulation of Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 5, 47
(1993) (proposing that a rule should be adopted prohibiting attorney-client sexual
relations during the period of representation, where the client is a natural person).
21. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4; Craig D. Feiser, Strange Bedfellows: The
Effectiveness of Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 33 J. LEGAL
PROF. 53 (2008); Buckner & Sall, supra note 20; Rachel Abigail Herrin, Let’s Get
It on: Why Model Rule 1.8(j) Is Overinclusive (a Three-Pronged Argument), 31 J.
LEGAL PROF. 307 (2007); Phillip R. Bower & Tanya E. Stern, Conflict of
Interest?: The Absolute Ban on Lawyer-Client Sexual Relationships Is Not
Absolutely Necessary, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535 (2003); see also Southwick,
supra note 2 (questioning the case for sex-specific rules).
22. See Dane S. Ciolino, Lawyer Ethics Reform in Perspective: A Look at the
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Before and After Ethics 2000, 65 LA. L.
REV. 535, 544–45 (2005).
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deliberations, “the committee decided that it would not deviate from the
language of the ABA Model Rules unless there was a compelling reason
for doing so.”23 Nonetheless, after many meetings, the committee
ultimately decided, on a five-to-five vote, not to recommend adoption of
ABA Model Rule 1.8(j).24 To the extent that the five members of the
committee who voted against adoption adhered to the committee rule
about deviating from the language of the Model Rules, they presumably
were of the view that there was a compelling reason not to adopt Model
Rule 1.8(j).
In December of 2002, the committee submitted a report to the
Louisiana State Bar Association’s House of Delegates on recommended
changes to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.25 Following
debate, and after making a few modifications, none of which related to
Model Rule 1.8(j), the House of Delegates unanimously approved the
report on January 25, 2003.26 The president of the bar association
thereafter submitted the approving resolution to the Louisiana Supreme
Court.27
In a letter dated 29 October 2003, addressed to committee chair Harry
S. Hardin, III, Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero of the Louisiana Supreme
Court asked for some additional information about the proposed rule
changes. The chief justice inquired about several matters, but he had this
to say about the recommendation on Rule 1.8(j):

23. Id. at 546.
24. See id. at 547, 568. The committee actually voted twice. According to the
minutes of the committee’s meeting on November 4, 2002: “A motion was made
to add the sex with clients rule from the ABA. There was discussion and the vote
was as follows: 4 In favor of 4 Against and 1 abstention. This matter will be held
in abeyance until the next meeting of the Committee.” LA. STATE BAR ASS’N
ETHICS 2000 COMM., MINUTES OF MEETING 2 (Nov. 4, 2002). The next meeting
took place on November 5, 2002. According to the minutes of that meeting: “ABA
Rule 1.8(j) was revisited dealing with sex with clients. There was a motion to add
ABA 1.8(j). The vote was 5 to 5 to add the ABA model rule. The motion failed
for lack of a majority. 1.8(j) will not be added to the E2K recommendations.” LA.
STATE BAR ASS’N ETHICS 2000 COMM., MINUTES OF MEETING 3 (Nov. 5, 2002).
25. See Ciolino, supra note 22, at 547.
26. See Letter (with accompanying agenda) from Larry Feldman, Jr.,
President, La. State Bar Ass’n, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., C.J., La. Sup. Ct. (on
file with the Louisiana State Bar Association). The accompanying agenda
indicates that there were eleven “resolutions” that proposed changes to the
recommendations of the Ethics 2000 Committee, none of which focused on Model
Rule 1.8(j).
27. See Ciolino, supra note 22, at 547.
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The Ethics 2000 Committee did not adopt ABA Model Rule
1.8(j), because this type of relationship is purportedly addressed
by other rules, such as 1.7 (conflict) and 2.1 (independent advice).
Nonetheless, the ABA has suggested the adoption of a “bright
line” rule to clarify conduct which is clearly unethical. In theory
at least, there is a benefit to providing continuing and clear notice
to lawyers of the type of conduct that is prohibited.
As you are aware, unethical sexual conduct has been addressed by
the Court before. See, e.g., In Re Schambach, 98-2432 (La.
1/29/99), 726 So.2d 892; In Re Ashy, 98-0662 (La. 12/1/98), 721
So.2d 859. We would ask you to reconsider this omission,
particularly in view of the benefits to be provided by the notice
and clarity which may be offered by the subject ABA Model Rule.
If the Committee’s decision on reconsideration remains
unchanged, we would ask for a brief explanation of why not
having a rule like ABA Model ROPC 1.8(j) is the better way of
proceeding.28
Based on the quoted language from the letter, it appears that the court
was concerned about the committee’s decision not to approve inclusion of
Rule 1.8(j). It was an “omission” that “[w]e would ask you to reconsider.”
Moreover, if, upon reconsideration, the committee’s view would remain
unchanged, the court wanted “a brief explanation” why.
The committee submitted a memorandum in response to the court’s
letter. The memorandum addressed several matters. With respect to Model
Rule 1.8(j), the committee noted that, after a 5-to-5 vote, the committee
had not recommended adoption of the rule. It then observed: “No member
of the LSBA House of Delegates moved the adoption of ABA Model Rule
1.8(j). Thereafter the LSBA House of Delegates, without further debate
concurred with the Committee’s proposal.”29 Although the committee said
that it “understands the Court’s concern,” it was “hesitant at this stage to
formally recommend a change to the proposal actually passed by the
House of Delegates.”30
Nonetheless, the committee offered the following reasons why its
members had voted for and against adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j):

28. Letter from Pascal F. Calogero, C.J., La. Sup. Ct., to Harry. S. Hardin,
III, Chair, La. State Bar Ass’n Ethics 2000 Comm. (Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with
the Louisiana State Bar Association).
29. Id. at 8–9.
30. Id. at 9.
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For the Court’s information, however, those members of the
Committee who voted against adopting Rule 1.8(j) did so for the
following reasons: (1) they felt that the Court’s existing case law
adequately addresses the complex and variable issues associated
with “unethical” sexual conduct; (2) they felt that a bright-line rule
could serve as a safe-harbor sheltering lawyers engaged in sexual
conduct that is inappropriate, but that comports with the letter of
Rule 1.8(j); and, (3) they felt that there may be situations in which
sexual conduct should not be treated as per se sanctionable.
On the other hand, those who voted for adopting Model Rule 1.8(j)
did so for the following reasons: (1) they felt that a refusal to adopt
Rule 1.8(j) could be misconstrued by the bar and the public as
indicating that Louisiana has opted for a more permissive attitude
with respect to sexual relations with clients, when that is clearly
not the case; (2) they felts that the proposed rule is not inconsistent
with existing jurisprudence in Louisiana; and (3) they felt that
even if a sexual relationship predates the representation—and thus
is not covered by the proposed rule—the lawyer is nonetheless
constrained by other rules, including Rule 1.7(b), which the Court
already has interpreted to prohibit sexual misconduct adversely
affecting the client, as was the case in Ashy and Schambach,
contrary to the “safe harbor” contention.31

31. Id. (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote relates to situations in which,
at least in the view of some committee members, lawyer sexual conduct should
not be treated as per se sanctionable:
For example, consider Firm X, which represents both Client ABC, Inc.
and Law Firm Y.
Attorney Q in law firm X, after the representation of Client ABC
commences, becomes sexually involved with a senior vice president of
Client ABC. The senior vice president is a member of the management
committee of Client ABC but does not direct litigation or recommend
counsel. Attorney Q does not do any legal work for Client ABC;
Attorney Q’s legal work for Firm X is in other fields.
Attorney Z in law firm X, after the representation of Law Firm Y,
becomes sexually involved with a partner of Law Firm Y. The partner in
Law Firm Y is not on the management committee of Law Firm Y, but
has imputed knowledge of all Law Firm Y’s confidences under Rule
1.10.
In both cases, members of the Committee believed that a bright line rule
against sexual relationships may be overreaching.
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In the end, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided against adoption of
Model Rule 1.8(j).32 But it approved other revisions to the Louisiana Rules
of Professional Conduct, effective March 1, 2004.33 Since 2004, there have
been a number of changes to the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.34 However, as of this writing, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
not adopted Model Rule 1.8(j).35
II. LOUISIANA LAWYER SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES
We will now turn to Louisiana cases involving sexual misconduct by
lawyers. Lawyers can experience various adverse consequences for
sexually related misbehavior, including criminal prosecution or tort
liability.36 However, the focus of this Article will be on professional
Id. at 9. This argument against adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) seems questionable.
In both of the cases, the client is an organization, and the sexual relationship is
not with the client; it is with a constituent of the client. The text of Model Rule
1.8(j) prohibits sexual relations with clients, not constituents of clients. One of the
comments to Model Rule 1.8 does apply the rule of 1.8(j) to a constituent of a
client organization, but only to a constituent “who supervises, directs or regularly
consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.” See MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The committee’s
examples do not seem to come within the ambit of this provision. Indeed, in the
first example, the lawyer is described as one who does not even do work for the
organization. That lawyer surely would not be one who would be supervised or
directed by a constituent of the organization, or one who would be consulted
concerning the organization’s legal matters. Id.
32. See Ciolino, supra note 22, at 568.
33. See id. at 547–48.
34. The changes can be found on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s website at
https://www.lasc.org/Supreme_Court_Rules?p=Rule_Changes. Louisiana Supreme
Court Rule Change Orders, LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT (July 31, 2020)
https://www.lasc.org/Supreme_Court_Rules?p=Rule_Changes
[https://perma.cc/56GY-KAU9] (last visited July 31, 2020).
35. Louisiana is not alone in this respect. See Baker, supra note 4, at 253–57
(discussing approaches taken in different jurisdictions and asking, “Why would
approximately one-fourth of attorney disciplinary bodies not adopt an express
prohibition on attorney-client sexual relationships?”); Stilley, supra note 4, at 499,
512–25 (including a table showing different approaches taken in different
jurisdictions).
36. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 66 So. 3d 434 (La. 2011) (per curiam) (attorney
disciplined for sexual assault; opinion states that he was also sentenced to life
imprisonment); In re Redd, 660 So. 2d 839 (La. 1995) (per curiam) (lawyer
disciplined for sexually related misconduct; opinion states that he was also
convicted of simple battery); Doe v. Hawkins, 42 So. 3d 1000 (La. Ct. App. 3d
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discipline. Part II begins with disciplinary cases that arise out of criminally
related sexual misconduct; thereafter, it will consider disciplinary cases
that arise out of non-criminally related sexual misconduct by Louisiana
lawyers.
A. Criminal Sexual Misconduct
Quite a few Louisiana lawyers have been subject to professional
discipline for engaging in criminally related sexual misconduct. Most of
these disciplinary cases feature nonclient victims—usually adults, but
sometimes minors.
1. Adult Nonclient Victims
The earliest reported disciplinary action involving sexual misconduct
by a Louisiana lawyer appears to be In re Redd.37 It is a criminal battery
case, involving an adult, nonclient victim. Richard Redd served as the
legal advisor to the Baton Rouge Police Department. His duties included
evaluation of exotic dancer permit applications. After receiving some
complaints about him,
the police sent a wired confidential informant to respondent’s
office to apply for an exotic dancer’s permit. After commenting
on the female applicant’s breasts, respondent requested and took
photographs of her breasts. He also obtained her home telephone
number and made references to oral sex. After the police arrested
respondent, a search of his office yielded a camera and
photographs of other nude or partially nude women. Respondent
eventually pleaded guilty to a charge of simple battery involving
the touching of the applicant’s breasts.38
Professional disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Redd,
“based on the conviction of a serious crime.”39
Cir. 2010) (client, who was also an employee of the law firm, sought damages,
claiming that one of the firm’s partners raped her at a social event); see also
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §1.8–.11 (2018) (referring to risks of malpractice
and reversal); Feiser, supra note 21, at 71–73 (discussing possible state court
remedies for clients).
37. In re Redd, 660 So. 2d 839 (La. 1995) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 840.
39. Id.
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The case eventually came before the Louisiana Supreme Court. After
considering the facts of the case, the court said that Redd had:
used his position of authority, obtained because of his license to
practice law, over persons whose livelihood depended on his
approval of their applications. Such behavior revealed a serious
flaw in respondent’s fitness to practice law.
Although respondent’s offense did not involve his client directly,
it involved betrayal of his client by misusing and taking advantage
of his position as the department’s legal advisor, which is as bad,
if not worse, than an offense involving a client.40
Redd argued that a “delay” between his criminal conviction and the
initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings should obviate the need for a
sanction, but the court concluded that a sanction was warranted because of
the “extreme seriousness” of the attorney’s conduct.41 The court suspended
Redd for a year and a day.
The court obviously considered Redd’s criminal conduct to be very
serious, warranting formal discipline, but, in this early case of sexually
related lawyer misconduct, the court did not cite any of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as a basis for the discipline. The court might have
referred to Rule 8.4(b), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to . . . [c]ommit a criminal act especially one that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects.”42 Instead, the court invoked its rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement, referring to a provision defining a “serious
crime” as a “felony or any other crime, the necessary element of which as
determined by the statute defining such crime, reflects upon the attorney’s
moral fitness to practice law.”43
Since the decision in the Redd case, there have been several additional
Louisiana cases in which lawyers have been disciplined for sexually
related criminal acts involving adult, nonclient victims. These cases have
referenced Rule 8.4(b).

40. Id. at 840–41.
41. Id. at 840.
42. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (2018). ABA Model Rule 8.4(b)
is narrower. It provides, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (b)
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”
43. In re Redd, 660 So. 2d at 840.
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One of these cases, In re Plaisance,44 is a consent discipline45 case in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court disbarred attorney Gavin Plaisance
after he had placed
a motion-sensored video camera under a ceiling tile inside the
ladies [sic] restroom at the law firm where he was employed,
which was later discovered by a secretary at the firm. When
viewed, the videotape in the camera was found to contain excerpts
of female employees using the restroom, and also showed
respondent, who inadvertently caught himself on video while
placing the camera in the bathroom.46
Given the consent discipline posture of the case, there is no discussion
of the actual criminal infraction, the seriousness of the misconduct, or the
justifications for the sanction. The court’s opinion simply notes that the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (hereinafter the “ODC”) concurred in the
petition and filed a memorandum alleging that the lawyer’s actions
“constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct pertaining to conduct adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness and fitness.”47
In In re Dixon,48 the Louisiana Supreme Court gave attorney Jerome
Dixon a three-year suspension for several acts of misconduct, including
conversion of client funds and a criminal incident of sexual misconduct.
With respect to the latter, according to the reported opinion, Dixon “paid
a woman $20 to have sexual intercourse with him. A police officer
interrupted the sexual act, and both respondent and the woman admitted
that respondent had paid $20 in exchange for sexual intercourse.”49 Dixon
pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor prostitution charge. The ODC
thereafter charged him with a violation of Rule 8.4(b). In subsequent
disciplinary proceedings, the hearing committee concluded that Dixon had
violated that rule and had acted intentionally in doing so. Although the
“heartland” misconduct in the case related to Dixon’s mishandling of trust
accounts, in its summary of Dixon’s misconduct the Louisiana Supreme
Court noted that the lawyer had engaged in a criminal act.50
44. In re Plaisance, 706 So. 2d 969 (La. 1998) (per curiam).
45. A petition for consent discipline is one in which the ODC and the attorney
who is subject to discipline jointly propose discipline to the Louisiana Supreme
Court. See LA. SUP.CT. R. XIX § 20 (2019).
46. In re Plaisance, 706 So. 2d at 969.
47. Id.
48. In re Dixon, 55 So. 3d 758 (La. 2011) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 761.
50. Id. at 765.
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In re Dillon,51 decided the same year as Dixon, is a disciplinary case
that arose out of an attorney’s criminal conviction for sexually assaulting
two women while acting under color of state law in his capacity as a deputy
city attorney for the city of New Orleans. The ODC filed formal charges,
alleging that Dillon had committed a criminal act in violation of Rule
8.4(b). The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered permanent disbarment.52 In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on “Guideline 4,” from its Rules
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, which identifies “[s]exual
misconduct which results in a felony criminal conviction, such as rape or
child molestation” as a justification for permanent disbarment.53
The most recent case of criminal sexual misconduct by a Louisiana
lawyer involving an adult nonclient victim is In re Gaubert.54 According
to the reported opinion, while she was an intoxicated passenger in a
taxicab, attorney Jennifer Gaubert had a sexual encounter with the cab
driver. The state charged her with simple battery. The driver also filed a
civil lawsuit against her. Gaubert claimed that she had been the victim of
extortion and video voyeurism perpetrated by the cab driver, but she was
ultimately found guilty of simple battery for her conduct in the cab and of
criminal mischief for her allegations against the driver. The ODC charged
Gaubert with a violation of Rule 8.4(b). Focusing on the criminal
convictions, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a year-and-a-day
suspension. The reported opinion did not cite earlier cases involving
sexual misconduct by Louisiana lawyers, and it did not discuss sexual
misconduct, as such.
2. Adult Client Victims
The victims in the previously referenced “criminal” cases55 were
nonclients. In contrast, the 2011 decision in In re Hammond56 involved
51. In re Dillon, 66 So. 3d 434 (La. 2011) (per curiam).
52. Permanent disbarment is what it sounds like. An attorney who is regularly
disbarred can apply for readmission after five years. Attorneys who are
permanently disbarred cannot. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, §§ 20(A) & 24 (2019).
53. In re Dillon, 66 So. 3d at 438. At the time that the case was decided, the
guidelines were found in Appendix E to Rule XIX. See id. They are now found in
Appendix D. Guideline 4 is still the same. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, app. D (2019).
54. In re Gaubert, 263 So. 3d 408 (La. 2019) (per curiam).
55. For convenience, I will sometimes refer to the disciplinary cases
involving sexually related criminal conduct by lawyers as “criminal” cases.
However, the cases are professional discipline cases, not cases in which the
lawyers are criminal defendants.
56. In re Hammond, 56 So. 3d 199 (La. 2011) (per curiam).
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client victims. Attorney Noland Hammond was charged with 24 counts of
misconduct, the majority of which involved sexual activities targeting
male, criminal defendant-clients.57 For example, according to the opinion:
(1) Hammond and his female “assistant” visited two clients in a detention
center. The assistant performed oral sex on the clients while Hammond
filmed the activity. Hammond told the clients that he needed semen
samples in order to obtain the clients’ release from incarceration;58 (2)
Hammond took a criminal defense client to his home, told the client that
he needed to see him in boxer shorts, and grabbed his penis and stroked it
when the client could not achieve an erection;59 (3) Hammond solicited
sexual contact with incarcerated clients when he spoke with them by
telephone;60 and (4) during a meeting with a client seeking post-conviction
relief, Hammond grabbed the client’s penis and said he wanted to have sex
with him. When it became clear that the client would not engage in any
sex acts, Hammond did no further work on the client’s matter. 61
Hammond faced criminal charges for some of his actions,62 and
several of Hammond’s acts of misconduct were found to have violated
Rule 8.4(b), based on the commission of criminal acts.63 However,
Hammond was found to have violated other rules as well, including Rule
1.7(a)(2), which prohibits conflicts of interests based on the personal
interests of an attorney;64 Rule 8.4(c), which makes it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
57. The other charges involved neglect of client matters, failure to
communicate with clients, failure to properly terminate client representation, and
engaging in unauthorized practice of law following interim suspension. Id. at 201.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court ended up focusing on charges involving
sexual misconduct and unauthorized practice of law, because those “charges,
standing alone, support the disciplinary board’s recommendation of permanent
disbarment.” Id.
58. Counts I and II. Id. at 201–02.
59. Count IV. Id. at 203.
60. Count III. Id. at 202–03.
61. Count X. Id. at 204.
62. According to the reported opinion, the state indicted Hammond on
obscenity charges for the conduct referred to in item (1). Those charges were
ultimately dismissed. Id. at 202.
63. For example, Hammond was found to have violated the rule in connection
with items (1), (2), and (3) referred to above.
64. For example, Hammond was found to have violated the rule in connection
with items (1), (2), (3), and (4) referred above. The opinion is not explicit about
how Hammond’s conduct violated this rule. However, it seems reasonable to
conclude that Hammond had a “personal interest” in having sex with some of his
clients.
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misrepresentation;65 and Rule 8.4(d), which makes it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”66 In some instances, the same behavior violated
more than one rule.
The opinion does not provide much elaboration on how Hammond’s
conduct violated particular rules. But it is clear that Hammond had
engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, the majority of which involved
sexual misconduct, and that Hammond had abused his position as an
attorney for sexually connected purposes. The Louisiana Supreme Court
agreed with the disciplinary board that Hammond’s misconduct was so
“egregious” that he should be permanently disbarred.67
3. Nonadult Victims
Louisiana lawyers have also engaged in criminal sexual misconduct
targeting minors. Lawyers who have done so have drawn particularly
harsh disciplinary sanctions.
It appears that the earliest of these cases, decided in 1997, is In re
Hammel.68 There, attorney John Hammel pleaded guilty to one count of
molestation of a juvenile and one count of aggravated oral sexual battery
upon a juvenile. Following sentencing, the ODC filed formal charges,
alleging that Hammel had engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Rule
8.4(b). Hammel did not answer the charges or appear at the hearing, so the
charges were deemed admitted. The disciplinary board noted that “the
underlying facts to which respondent pleaded guilty established beyond
any doubt that he is morally unfit to practice law.”69 It recommended
disbarment. Without engaging in a discussion of Hammel’s misconduct,
the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted the recommendation.
Concerns about “moral fitness” resurfaced in the 2002 decision in In
re Boudreau.70 The state indicted attorney Albert Boudreau on 13 counts
of violating child pornography laws. He pleaded guilty to smuggling and
possessing magazines containing child pornography, which are felonies
65. For example, Hammond was found to have violated the rule in connection
item (1) referred to above, by “coercing” the clients “to engage in sexual acts
under false pretenses.” Id. at 211.
66. For example, Hammond was found to have violated the rule in connection
with items (1), (3), and (4) above. The Board also found Hammond violated other
rules, including Rule 5.5 for engaging in unauthorized practice of law. See id. at 213.
67. Id. at 214.
68. In re Hammel, 701 So. 2d 969 (La. 1997) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 969.
70. In re Boudreau, 815 So. 2d 76 (La. 2002) (per curiam).
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under federal law. Based on this conduct, the ODC filed formal charges,
alleging that Boudreau had violated Rule 8.4(b). The disciplinary board
found that Boudreau had
intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the profession
by participating in the sexual exploitation of children. The board
noted respondent supported “an industry that capitalizes on the
degradation of children, which serves only to demoralize our
society and damage children.” It reasoned that because respondent
is a lawyer and an officer of the court, his “blatant disregard of
laws meant to protect those most vulnerable, children, is a stain
upon the legal profession and dishonors every lawyer’s effort to
uphold the law.”71
The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted the recommendation of the
disciplinary board that Boudreau be disbarred, and it said that Boudreau’s
“conviction clearly reflects upon his moral fitness to practice law.”72
The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered permanent disbarment in In re
Aguillard.73 According to the reported opinion, attorney Michael
Aguillard
made Internet contact with a person whom he believed to be a
thirteen-year old evacuee from New Orleans. Respondent
arranged to meet the girl in a park in Broussard, Louisiana for the
purpose of engaging in sexual relations. In reality, the “girl” was
an investigator from the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office,
which had been conducting an online undercover operation in
cooperation with the Lafayette Police Department. When
respondent arrived at the park on September 13, 2005 to meet the
girl, he was arrested and charged in East Baton Rouge Parish with
one count of computer-aided solicitation of a minor.
Subsequent investigation of information found on respondent’s
computer hard drive revealed that he had previously engaged in
sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year old girl from Arnaudville,
Louisiana. On September 16, 2005, respondent was rearrested in
St. Landry Parish and charged with carnal knowledge of a juvenile
and indecent behavior with a juvenile.74
71.
72.
73.
74.
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Aguillard ended up pleading guilty to a felony count of computeraided solicitation of a minor and to two felony counts of carnal knowledge
of a juvenile. The ODC charged the attorney with violations of Rule
8.4(a)75 and 8.4(b). The disciplinary board recommended permanent
disbarment, and the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, stating that “the
imposition of any sanction less than permanent disbarment would require
us to ignore the seriousness of respondent’s conduct and the grave harm
he has done to his juvenile victim and to the public’s confidence in the
legal profession.”76 This time, the court did not use explicit “moral fitness”
language; however, the court characterized the attorney’s conduct as
“egregious,” so it seems fair to think that the moral fitness theme was
present in Aguillard, as well.
The moral fitness theme came up again in In re Domm,77 another case
in which a lawyer was alleged to have molested a child. According to the
reported opinion, attorney Edward Domm
represented a client in a child custody matter. Respondent
befriended the client and her nine-year old stepdaughter, K.H.,
who often stayed overnight at respondent’s home to play with his
young daughter. . . . K.H. gave a videotaped statement to a
counselor from Child Protective Services in which she stated that
she sat on respondent’s lap while watching a video at his home
one night and that he then touched her vagina on the outside of her
clothes. Respondent voluntarily gave a statement to the police and
denied these allegations; however, based upon K.H.’s statement,
a warrant was issued for his arrest on one count of molestation of
a juvenile.78
The state dropped the criminal charges after K.H.’s stepmother
decided that K.H. would not testify. However, he ODC nonetheless filed
formal charges, alleging, among other things,79 that Domm had violated
Rule 8.4(b). Domm did not contest the charges, so the factual allegations
were deemed to have been admitted. The Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that the record supported a finding that Domm had “knowingly
75. This part of Rule 8.4 makes it professional misconduct to violate or
attempt to violate any of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See LA. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (2018).
76. In re Aguillard, 958 So. 2d at 674.
77. In re Domm, 965 So. 2d 380 (La. 2007) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 382.
79. The ODC also charged Domm with neglecting a separate client matter
and related misconduct.
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and intentionally engaged in conduct involving moral depravity with a
minor child.”80 It ordered permanent disbarment, stating: “Considering the
egregious nature of respondent’s misconduct in this matter together with
his prior disciplinary record, we conclude respondent lacks the moral
fitness to practice law in this state.”81
4. Comment on the Criminal Cases
Many of the criminal sexual misconduct cases involved extremely
reprehensible behavior by attorneys, and it is not surprising their behavior
resulted in severe disciplinary sanctions. However, regardless of the
relative reprehensibility of the criminally related sexual conduct, Rule
8.4(b) was available as a basis for lawyer discipline. That rule allows for
the imposition of professional discipline based on criminal acts by
lawyers, including criminal acts that are sexually related.
Even if Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in place at the time when the cases
were decided, it would not have made a difference. Model Rule 1.8(j) is
concerned with sexual relations with clients. Only one of the cases in the
group—In re Hammond—featured client-victims. Assuming that the
rule’s reference to “sexual relations” were broad enough to cover the
sexually oriented telephone conversations or instances of sexual touching
that were involved in that case,82 the court might have used Model Rule
80. Id. at 385.
81. Id. In recommending permanent disbarment, the disciplinary board had
relied, in part, on In re Hinson-Lyles, 864 So. 2d 108 (La. 2003) (per curiam), a
bar admission case. See In re Domm, 965 So. 2d at 384. There, bar applicant
Hinson-Lyles had been denied admission because, while serving as a high-school
teacher, she had entered into a sexual relationship with one of her minor students.
Referring to the recommendation of the disciplinary board, the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s opinion in Domm states:
Like the teacher in Hinson-Lyles, respondent occupied a position of trust,
as he was the only adult present when the minor victim spent the night
at his home. Respondent violated that trust and the trust of the victim’s
stepmother by allegedly molesting the nine-year old girl. . . . As the court
decided in Hinson-Lyles, respondent has demonstrated that he lacks the
moral character to be a member of the bar.
Id.
82. Model Rule 1.8(j) has been criticized for not defining “sexual relations.”
See infra text accompanying note 286. In some states, definitions of “sexual
relations” have been incorporated into the corresponding rules. For example,
Utah’s Rule 1.8(j) includes a provision that states that “‘sexual relations’ means
sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” UTAH RULES OF PRO.
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1.8(j) as a basis of lawyer discipline, if the rule had been in place at the
relevant time. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court had little difficulty
relying on other rules for its conclusion that Hammond should be
permanently disbarred. The application of Model Rule 1.8(j) would not
have yielded a different outcome.
B. Noncriminal Sexual Misconduct
The preceding section of this Article considered professional
discipline cases in which sexual misconduct by Louisiana lawyers was
examined through a “criminal act” lens; that is, cases in which lawyers
were subject to professional discipline because their conduct was, at least
in part, criminal in nature. Most of those cases did not involve clients. This
section focuses on “noncriminal” cases, meaning disciplinary cases in
which the sexual misconduct by lawyers is principally subject to rules
other than 8.4(b).83 In contrast to the cases in the criminal category, most
of the cases in the noncriminal group involve clients. And these cases, in
turn, can be divided into two subgroups. The first subgroup is
nonconsensual—cases in which the other person did not consent to the
lawyer’s sexually related conduct. The second group is consensual—cases
in which the person did consent to the lawyer’s sexually related conduct.
1. Nonconsensual cases
This part of the Article discusses noncriminal disciplinary cases in
which the lawyers’ sexually related conduct was nonconsensual.
a. Nonclients
In some instances, Louisiana lawyers have been subject to disciplinary
proceedings for noncriminal, nonconsensual sexual conduct involving
nonclients.
The oldest of these cases, and the one that probably contributes the
least to our understanding, appears to be In re Bonnie.84 In that case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a petition for consent discipline for a
CONDUCT r. 1.8(j)(1) (2020). Some of Hammond’s conduct would have violated
that standard.
83. It is possible that the same sexually related conduct could run afoul of
more than one rule. This was the case in In re Hammond, in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court concluded that some of Hammond’s sexually related conduct
toward clients had violated Rule 8.4(b) as well as other rules.
84. In re Bonnie, 704 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1997).
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public reprimand and a 12-month probation for an attorney who, “during
a nine-month period of representation, made improper sexual advances
towards his client’s wife, and offered her sums of money in exchange for
sexual favors.”85 Rejection of the petition for consent discipline indicates
that the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the proposed sanction to be
insufficient.86
The other case in this category, In re Wiegand,87 contributes a bit
more. Wiegand is a reciprocal discipline88 case, in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court disciplined a Louisiana-admitted attorney for sexually
harassing female employees in his Colorado law office. According to the
opinion, attorney Robert Wiegand “engaged in various behaviors” that
made his female associate and his female office manager “uncomfortable
and caused them emotional harm.”89 These included “touching the
associate on her back, tapping the office manager on her buttocks with a
rolled-up magazine, making comments about women wearing swimsuits
at office pool parties, and asking about gynecological care when setting up
health insurance.”90 There was some evidence that Wiegand had also been
involved in setting up a surveillance camera in a restroom at his Denverarea law office.
The employees left the firm and filed discrimination claims.
Following a trial, the court found in favor of the employees on their claims
of sexual discrimination and premises liability. Professional disciplinary
proceedings were thereafter initiated in Colorado. In those proceedings,
Wiegand stipulated that his conduct had violated a Colorado rule
prohibiting lawyers from engaging in “conduct that directly, intentionally,
and wrongfully harms others and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s
fitness to practice law.”91 Colorado disciplinary authorities suspended him
85. The quotation is from In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859, 865 (La. 1998) (per
curiam), which this Article will discuss later. The memorandum disposition for
the Bonnie case itself contains very little content. In the Ashy case, however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court said that In re Bonnie was one of only three previous
“opinions from this court that involve sexual misconduct by an attorney.” Id.; see
In re Bonnie, 704 So. 2d 1179.
86. See, e.g., In re Goff, 837 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (La. 2003) (per curiam)
(member of the court concurred in rejection of consent discipline primarily
because the period of suspension was totally deferred).
87. In re Wiegand, 267 So. 3d 64 (La. 2019) (per curiam).
88. “Reciprocal discipline” refers to discipline in Louisiana that is based on a
disciplinary order from another jurisdiction. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, § 21 (2019).
89. In re Wiegand, 267 So. 2d at 65.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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for a year and a day, stayed upon completion of a two-year period of
probation.
When it received notice of the Colorado disciplinary order, the ODC
initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding in Louisiana, where Wiegand
was also admitted to practice law. Wiegand did not oppose imposition of
identical discipline in Louisiana for his conduct in Colorado. Without
discussing any of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ordered the same sanction that had been
imposed in Colorado.
These two cases demonstrate that a Louisiana lawyer may be subject
to professional discipline for noncriminal, nonconsensual sexual conduct
involving nonclients, including, in Wiegand, conduct amounting to sexual
harassment. Beyond that, the cases do not say much about lawyer sexual
misconduct. That changes when we take up the next group of cases.
b. Clients
There have been several Louisiana cases featuring noncriminal,
nonconsensual sexual conduct involving clients. Some of these cases are
ones in which Rule 1.8(j) might have had indirect application had it been
in place at the relevant time.
i. In re Ashy
The first case in this category, In re Ashy,92 is a groundbreaking case
that deserves a fair amount of attention. According to the reported opinion,
Charles Williams and Regine Dade came into the office of attorney
Warren Ashy and asked him to see if there were any outstanding warrants
against Williams. Williams had apparently been warned that he might be
the subject of a criminal investigation. At the time of this visit, Dade was
a college student, living at home with her parents. The sight-impaired
Williams employed her to help him with various tasks. Ashy had
previously done some legal work for Dade.
After Williams and Dade had departed, and after doing some
checking, Ashy called Williams and informed him that he was “hot,” and
that Dade might also be implicated. Ashy asked for Dade’s telephone
number, but Williams did not provide it. However, Dade later called Ashy,
and she thereafter met with Ashy at his office. According to the reported
opinion, Ashy
told her that she and Williams might both be in trouble with the
92. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859 (La. 1998).

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 118

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LOUISIANA LAWYERS

791

law. During the course of this meeting, respondent told Dade she
“had certainly grown up,” was “very attractive,” and asked if she
“minded if he hit on her.” He also asked her if she dated older
married men and if she would like an older man to take care of
her. When he shook her hand, he kissed her without her consent
and she pushed him away.93
Williams and Dade returned to Ashy’s office the next day. Williams
gave Ashy $10,000 to represent both of them. Later that day, Dade met
with Ashy again. According to Dade’s later testimony before a hearing
committee:
Tuesday afternoon he suggested that I come back following the
meeting with Mr. Williams by myself, because he had a client
coming in. He didn’t have enough time to speak with me. So I
came back and it was during office hours so I wasn’t real nervous
and I did have to leave because I taught aerobics that afternoon at
5:30 and I had to leave and get across town. So I got there, I guess,
around 4:00 or 4:15 and we spoke. And he suggested that he could
sell his soul to a friend of his that would make me disappear in the
eyes of the law and if I did—and I immediately questioned what I
would have to do in return for this selling of his soul. And he said
that he wanted a relationship with me—an ongoing sexual
relationship me.94
Following what the opinion refers to as some “misrepresentations and
threats,”95 the following occurred, according to Dade’s testimony:
I said well I’ll do what I have to do but I just don’t want to get in
trouble and he said that he wanted me to tell him that we will make
love, he wanted me, he proceeded to touch my breast and my rear
end and he put my hand on his crotch, he told me he wanted me
to touch him. Ah he kissed me, he you know held me to him, he
93. Id. at 860.
94. Id. at 860–61.
95. Id. at 868. It is not entirely clear what the “misrepresentations” were. The
ODC later charged Ashy with misleading his clients into believing that they were
being criminally investigated. See id. at 862. However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that the ODC had not proven this misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence. Insofar as “threats” are concerned, the court likely was
focused on the fact that Ashy had “used his position to proposition his client in a
sexual manner with the threat that he would not exert all his legal efforts in
defending her case if she did not consent.” Id. at 864.
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wouldn’t let me pull away.96
Dade also testified that Ashy had given her $200 so she could buy
“something sexy from Victoria’s Secret and a nice dress to wear to his
office.”97
Dade did not enter into a sexual relationship with Ashy. In fact, a few
days after the encounter described above, Ashy told her, in a telephone
conversation, that their relationship had “headed in the wrong direction”
and that he was “finished with all that.”98 Williams, for his part, had come
to doubt that law enforcement authorities were investigating him and felt
that Ashy had “swindled” him. He contacted the police, “who investigated
the matter as a possible theft by fraud case.”99 Ashy ended up refunding
the fee. And Dade reported Ashy to the ODC, which initiated disciplinary
proceedings.100
The matter eventually came before the Louisiana Supreme Court. It
concluded that the ODC had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
Ashy had “attempted a sexual relationship with [Dade] in exchange for
certain efforts he would exert on her behalf as her lawyer.”101 It then said,
“In light of this factual finding, the issue becomes whether respondent’s
actions violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.”102
The court noted that “such conduct is not specifically addressed by the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”103 But it found guidance in a formal ethics
opinion by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility:
The American Bar Association has addressed the general issue of
sexual relationships between attorneys and clients in Formal
96. Id. at 868.
97. Id. at 861.
98. Id. at 862.
99. Id. at 861. The district attorney ultimately decided not to file criminal
charges. Id. at 862 n.4.
100. According to the court, the ODC’s formal charges:
essentially alleged two acts of misconduct on the part of respondent: (1)
in order to receive a fee, respondent misled his clients into believing they
were the subject of a criminal investigation; and (2) respondent
attempted to have a sexual relationship with Dade in exchange for
representing her in connection with the non-existent criminal charges.
Id. at 863. The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the ODC had
not proven the first act of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
101. Id. at 864.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 and concluded as follows:
A sexual relationship between lawyer and client may
involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary
position, and/or significantly impair a lawyer’s ability to
represent the client competently, and therefore may
violate both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
While recognizing that the present rules did not specifically
address the issue, the opinion found that the following existing
rules were potentially implicated:
First, because of the dependence that so often
characterizes the attorney-client relationship, there is a
significant possibility that the sexual relationship will
have resulted from exploitation of the lawyer’s dominant
position and influence and, thus breached the lawyer’s
fiduciary obligations to the client. Second, a sexual
relationship with a client may affect the independence of
the lawyer’s judgment. Third, the lawyer’s engaging in a
sexual relationship with a client may create a prohibited
conflict between the interests of the lawyer and those of
the client. Fourth, a non-professional yet emotionally
charged, relationship between attorney and client may
result in confidences being imparted in circumstances
where the attorney-client privilege is not available, yet
would have been absent the personal relationship.104
The Louisiana Supreme Court also considered what courts in other
jurisdictions had done in other cases involving lawyer sexual
misconduct.105 Then, referring to the matter before it, the court said:
104. Id.
105. Id. at 865–67. The court regarded some of those cases as having “factual
situations similar to the case at bar.” Id. at 866. After referring to the cases, the
court said:
Although in the above cases the punishment varied with the specific facts
of each case, in all instances the sexual misconduct resulted in a violation
of the existing rules of attorney conduct, even though those states did not
have a specific rule governing sexual relations or sexual misconduct with
clients.
Id. at 867.
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While this case does not involve a consensual sexual relationship,
it involves conduct in which an attorney used his position to
proposition his client in a sexual manner with the threat that he
would not exert all his legal efforts in defending her case if she
did not consent. This presents the intolerable situation envisioned
by the drafters of the ABA opinion that “the client may not feel
free to rebuff unwanted sexual advances because of fear that such
a rejection will either reduce the lawyer’s ardor for the client’s
cause or, worse yet, require finding a new lawyer.”106
The court said that it had “never addressed this situation.”107 But it said
that “even though sexual relations or sexual misconduct with a client is not
specifically addressed in our present Rules of Professional Conduct,
[Ashy’s] conduct violates several existing rules.”108
Which ones? Initially, the court focused on a rule prohibiting conflicts
of interest:
First, respondent’s conduct violates Rule 1.7(b) which states: “A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by . . . the lawyer’s own interests, unless;
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2) The client consents after consultation.”
As stated in [In re Piatt, 951 P. 2d 889 (Ariz. 1997)], such conduct
violates Rule 1.7(b) because “sexual harassment by a lawyer serves
the lawyer’s interest and not the client’s. Asking wholly
inappropriate questions and making obscene comments to a client
undermines trust in the lawyer and the representation.”
Furthermore, as in Piatt, this case went beyond sexual harassment.
Respondent told Dade that unless she responded sexually to him he
would not put forth his best efforts to represent her. “It is hard to
imagine a more egregious case of putting one’s interests ahead of
the client’s.” Id., 191 Ariz. 24, 951 P.2d 889. Clearly, in this case,
respondent could not have reasonably believed his representation of
Dade would not be adversely affected by his conduct, nor did Dade
consent after consultation.109
106. Id. at 864 (referring to ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op.
92-364 (1992)).
107. Id. at 865. The court was aware of older Louisiana sexual misconduct
cases, such as Redd and Plaisance, referred to previously, but they were not cases
involving sexual misconduct with clients.
108. Id. at 867.
109. Id.
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Ashy, then, had engaged in a prohibited conflict of interest. He had
also engaged in sexual harassment of a client by “[a]sking wholly
inappropriate questions and making obscene comments.” And he had gone
“beyond sexual harassment” by telling Dade “that unless she responded
sexually to him he would not put forth his best efforts to represent her.”
There was another theme lurking in the background. “[P]utting one’s
interests ahead of the client’s” is one way of describing a breach of
fiduciary duty.
These were not the only theories on which the court found Ashy’s
conduct to be problematic. The court also said:
Respondent’s conduct also violates Rule 2.1 which states that
“[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice.” As the
annotations to that rule provide:
“Emotional detachment,” in the words of the ABA’s
Ethics Committee, is “essential to the lawyer’s ability to
render competent legal services.” A lawyer who engages
in a sexual relationship with a client, the committee
concluded, risks losing “the objectivity and
reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer’s
independent professional judgment.” Because of this
threat to independent judgment, and because of the
problems of confidentiality and conflicts of interest that
lawyer-client sex presents, the committee concluded that
a lawyer would be “well advised to refrain from such a
relationship.”
. . . In this case, respondent promised to undertake special efforts
on behalf of Dade only if she entered into a sexual relationship
with him and not based on what efforts were necessary to her legal
defense based on his independent professional judgment.110
The fact that Dade did not enter into a sexual relationship with Ashy did
not matter. Ashy had proposed to link the quality of his legal services to
Dade’s sexual availability. His professional judgment had already been
affected. As the court stated: “A client should come to an attorney with the
confidence that the attorney will use his independent legal judgment in
putting forth his best legal efforts to represent the client.”111
110. Id.
111. Id. at 868.
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The court was not done. It indicated that Ashy had violated two
additional professional standards. Near the end of the opinion, the court
said that “[a]n attorney who threatens to limit his efforts on his client’s
behalf if the client fails to engage in a sexual relationship with him has
committed a very serious ethical offense. This undermines confidence in
the legal system and is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”112 Rule
8.4(d) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[i]t
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”113 This is one of the vaguer
standards articulated in the rules.114 It would have been helpful if the court
had been more explicit about how the rule actually applied in this case.
Ashy might have violated the standard if he had materially limited his
professional efforts on Dade’s behalf because she had refused to accede to
his sexual demands. But it does not appear that Ashy materially limited
his professional efforts. Instead, he threatened to do so.
A threat by the lawyer to materially limit professional efforts on behalf
a client might well run afoul of several different rules. For example, it
might be regarded as an attempt to violate Rule 1.1, the competency rule,
in violation of Rule 8.4(a).115 It might also be considered to involve a
“significant risk that the representation” of a client “will be materially
limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer,” in violation of Rule
1.7(a)(2).116 It might even be considered an attempt to engage in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, which could, again, implicate
Rule 8.4(a). Nevertheless, it seems somewhat aggressive to conclude that

112. Id.
113. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
114. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d at 867; see 2 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 6, § 69.06
(identifies problems with the rule, including its application to conduct that “seems
quite far from prejudicing the ‘administration’ of any particular proceeding or of
‘justice’ generally”).
115. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1, 8.4(a) (2018). Rule 1.1 requires
lawyers to “provide competent representation to a client.” And Rule 8.4(a) says,
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [v]iolate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Misconduct.” Id. r. 8.4(a).
116. Id. r. 1.7(a)(2). Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that, subject to some exceptions,
a lawyer should not represent a client if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.” Id. The lawyer’s threat to limit legal services unless the
client meets the lawyer’s personal sexual demands could be seen as such a risk.
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an unfulfilled threat to limit professional services actually prejudices the
administration of justice.117
The court went on to indicate that Ashy’s conduct had violated a fourth
professional standard. After quoting some of the provisions of Rule 8.4,
the misconduct rule,118 the court said:
Rule 8.4 also reaches instances of criminal sexual misconduct or
sexual exploitation of a nature that indicates the lawyer is
unworthy of the confidence reposed in him or her.” Annotations
to Model Rule 8.4, p. 563. We find that respondent’s conduct here
to be “sexual exploitation of a nature that indicates he is unworthy
of the confidence reposed in him.119

117. Another aggressive expression of Rule 8.4(d) surfaced in In re Downing,
930 So. 2d 897 (La. 2006) (per curiam). In that case, a lawyer was disciplined for
incompetent performance in a family law matter, which resulted in an improper
arrest of the client’s former spouse and exposed the client to a lawsuit. Id. The
court concluded that the lawyer had violated Rule 1.1 (the competency rule) and
Rule 8.4(d). In a footnote, the court said:
The proscription against conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of
justice
most
often
applies
to
litigation-related
misconduct. . . . However, Rule 8.4(d) also reaches conduct that is
uncivil, undignified, or unprofessional, regardless of whether it is
directly connected to a legal proceeding. See, e.g., In re Ashy, 98–0662
(La.12/1/98), 721 So.2d 859 (attorney who made unwanted sexual
advances toward a client was found to have violated Rule 8.4(d), among
other provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct).
Id. at 12 n.5. Applied literally, this word formula would allow lawyers to be
subject to formal discipline for mere “professionalism” missteps—something that
would be rather at odds with the efforts made by the Louisiana Supreme Court to
distinguish “professionalism” from “ethics” in its rules on continuing legal
education. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XXX R. 3(c) (2018). I discussed the court’s efforts
to distinguish those terms in N. Gregory Smith, Ethics v. Professionalism and the
Louisiana Supreme Court, 58 LA. L REV. 539 (1998).
118. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d at 867–68. The court said:
Respondent’s conduct also violates Rule 8.4 which provides that “[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct . . .; (b) commit a criminal act
especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d)
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”
Id.
119. Id. at 868.
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The court’s quotation does not appear to have been entirely accurate.
If one turns to page 563 of the version of the American Bar Association’s
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct,120 which would have
been in effect at the time of the Ashy decision, one finds the following:
“Rule 8.4(b) also reaches instances of criminal sexual misconduct or
sexual exploitation of a nature that indicates that the lawyer is unworthy
of the confidence reposed in him or her.”121 The apparent source of the
court’s quotation, then, referred to Rule 8.4(b), not to Rule 8.4 as a whole.
Rule 8.4(b) was relevant to cases in the criminal sexual misconduct
category. But the State did not charge Ashy with a crime for his sexually
related conduct toward Dade, and the court does not otherwise indicate
that his conduct ran afoul of Rule 8.4(b). Citation matters aside, in this
portion of its opinion, in this case of first impression, the court might have
intended to introduce a broader application of Rule 8.4—an application
that is not tethered to the particular subparts of the rule but can be
employed to discipline a lawyer for sexual exploitation of a client that
indicates that the lawyer is unworthy of the confidence reposed in the
lawyer by the client.
Dade testified that Ashy kissed her, touched her breast, put her hand
on his crotch, and would not let her pull away. This conduct could be
considered sexually exploitative. However, the court seemed to give more
attention to something else. The court said that “[Ashy] told Dade that
unless she responded sexually to him he would not put forth his best efforts
to represent her.”122 If Dade had entered into a sexual relationship with
Ashy on this basis, Ashy’s conduct would have been terribly exploitative.
As things developed, however, she did not enter into such a relationship,
and Ashy did not continue to be her lawyer. Even so, it seems that the
proposal of better legal services in exchange for a sexual relationship was
critical to the court’s determination that Ashy had violated professional
standards. One of the few places in the opinion where the court seems to
make an explicit “finding” appears to relate to that proposal:
Accordingly, based on our review of the record and the hearing
committee’s credibility determination based on the witnesses’
demeanor, we find that the ODC proved by clear and convincing
120. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1996).
121. Id. at 563.
122. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d at 867. On a related note, Dade told the hearing
committee: “And ah he told me that if I didn’t sleep with him that being where he
was he would do what he could to you know take care of everything but he
wouldn’t guarantee that everything would be taken care of but if I did everything
would disappear.” Id. at 861 n.2.
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evidence that respondent attempted a sexual relationship with
Dade in exchange for certain efforts he would exert on her behalf
as her lawyer.123
This “finding” seems to be the factual basis for the court’s conclusion
that Ashy violated Rules 1.7, 2.1, and 8.4. If that assessment is accurate,
then, according to the opinion, an attorney may be found to have engaged
in sexual exploitation of a client, and thereby to have violated Rule 8.4, if
the attorney proposes to provide legal services whose quality will be
tethered to the existence of lawyer-client sexual relationship. It would not
be necessary that the sexual relationship actually come into being, or that
the lawyer actually provide legal services on the sexually conditioned
basis. It would be enough that the lawyer proposes to do so.
The last two sexual misconduct themes from Ashy—that lawyer sexual
misconduct toward clients may be prejudicial to the administration of
justice under Rule 8.4(d), and that sexual exploitation of clients violates a
broader conception of Rule 8.4—do not appear to have had much staying
power. Later sexual misconduct cases that refer to Ashy tend to focus on
the conflict of interest theme, Rule 1.7, or the professional independence
theme, Rule 2.1, or both.124
At the end of the opinion in Ashy, the Louisiana Supreme Court
compared the conduct of Ashy to that of Redd. The Louisiana Supreme
Court had suspended Redd for a year and a day. However, the court said
that “the conduct in this case is more egregious than the conduct in In re
Redd.”125 It also noted that, in the earlier case, “the attorney had no
fiduciary relationship with the victim of the sexual misconduct as she was
not a client.”126 The hearing committee and the disciplinary board had both
recommended a public reprimand for Ashy, but the court found this to be
too lenient. It ordered a two-year suspension.
In this case of first impression, one gets the impression that the
Louisiana Supreme Court was trying out different theories of professional
misconduct, and that some of those trials worked better than others.
Perhaps the court’s conceptual burden would have been lighter if Model
Rule 1.8(j) been in place at the time the case was decided. Although Ashy
123. Id. at 864.
124. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7, 2.1 (2018). However, without citing
Ashy, Justice Weimer used a Rule 8.4(d) analysis in his concurring opinion in In
re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569, 579 (La. 2014) (per curiam), a sexual misconduct case
that we will consider later. So, it would be premature to consider the theory to be
dead.
125. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d at 868.
126. Id.
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did not have sexual relations with Dade, he tried to have them. He
attempted to do something that would have violated Rule 1.8(j) if it had
been in place at the relevant time. The attempt to violate Rule 1.8(j) would
have constituted a clear violation of Rule 8.4(a)—the rule that makes it
professional misconduct to “attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”127 This would have been something of an “indirect” application
of the Rule 1.8(j). However, there was more to the Ashy case than an
attempt to have sexual relations with a client. There was sexual touching,
and there was Ashy’s threat to limit his professional services if Dade did
not enter into a sexual relationship. Even if Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect,
it is likely that the court would still have regarded the threat as an
additional serious, indeed, “egregious,” matter and found that the conduct
had violated a separate professional standard. In the absence of Rule 1.8(j),
the Louisiana Supreme Court took the opportunity to strongly condemn
lawyer sexual misconduct with respect to clients.
ii. In re Touchet
Two years after the Ashy decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court took
up In re Touchet,128 a case in which the ODC charged attorney Francis
Touchet with six instances of sexual misconduct toward female clients.
According to the reported opinion, Touchet had: (1) attempted to solicit
sexual favors from a divorce client in lieu of legal fees and made sexually
suggestive remarks to her; (2) implied to a paternity-case client that he
would waive his fees in return for sexual favors; (3) implied to a divorce
client that he would waive his fees in return for sexual favors and made
sexually suggestive remarks to her; (4) pressured a divorce client into
having a sexual relationship with him, solicited sexual favors in lieu of
fees, made sexually suggestive remarks to her, and touched her without
her consent; (5) solicited sexual favors from a divorce client in lieu of fees,
made sexually suggestive remarks to her, and touched her without her
consent; and (6) solicited sexual favors from a business client, made
sexually suggestive remarks to her, tried to kiss her without her consent,
touched her without her consent, and exposed himself to her.
The ODC’s formal charges alleged conflicts of interest, in violation of
Rule 1.7; commission of a criminal act, in violation of Rule 8.4(b);
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c);
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of

127. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (2018).
128. In re Touchet, 753 So. 2d 820 (La. 2000) (per curiam).
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Rule 8.4(d).129 However, when the case reached the Louisiana Supreme
Court, it narrowed the disciplinary focus:
In Ashy, we addressed for the first time in Louisiana jurisprudence
whether sexual advances by an attorney toward a client could
constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. . . .
We concluded such conduct could represent a violation of several
professional rules, including Rule 1.7(b) (conflict of interest) and
Rule 2.1 (duty to exercise independent judgment) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
The concerns we expressed in Ashy are clearly illustrated in the
instant matter. By attempting to sexually exploit his clients,
respondent unquestionably violated his professional duty to
protect their interests. Respondent’s conduct is made even more
reprehensible by the fact that many of his clients consulted him in
connection with emotionally-charged domestic matters, and
respondent attempted to use their vulnerability to further his
sexual interests.130
The court did not expressly mention two of the theories it had used in
the Ashy case to conclude that that Ashy had engaged in misconduct: (1)
that he had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
in violation of Rule 8.4(d); and (2) that he had sexually exploited his client
in a manner that indicates that he was unworthy of the confidence reposed
in him by his client, in violation of Rule 8.4. If the court had been inclined
to reinforce or develop these two misconduct themes, Touchet would have
been a good case in which to have done so. After all, the court stated, in
Touchet, that the “concerns we expressed in Ashy are clearly illustrated in
the instant matter.”131 The ODC had actually charged Touchet with a
violation of Rule 8.4(d). The court’s opinion states that Touchet had
attempted to “sexually exploit his clients.”132 In addition, Touchet’s
behavior was much more egregious than Ashy’s. But the court did not
reinforce or develop these Rule 8.4 misconduct themes.133 If it is
reasonable to consider the Louisiana Supreme Court to have been trying
129. Id. at 822.
130. Id. at 823.
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Neither did the court focus on an allegation by the ODC that Touchet had
violated Rule 8.4(b).
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out different misconduct theories to deal with the lawyer’s sexual behavior
in the Ashy case, it appears to have narrowed its theoretical focus in
Touchet.
The court disbarred Touchet. This sanction is considerably more
severe than that two-year suspension that it had ordered in Ashy. However,
the cases are not the same. There were more “victims” in Touchet. “As the
disciplinary board observed,” said the court, “this fact alone justifies the
imposition of a harsher sanction than imposed in Ashy.”134 The court also
mentioned that many of the victims were particularly vulnerable.
In the absence of sexual relations between attorney and client, Rule
1.8(j), it if had been in effect, would not have had any more utility in
Touchet than in Ashy. Even so, the misconduct in Touchet was severe, and
it warranted severe discipline.
iii. In re DeFrancesch
In re DeFrancesch135 is something of a hybrid case. It features both
consensual and nonconsensual sexually related conduct by an attorney.
Because the disciplinary proceedings were initiated on account of the
nonconsensual conduct, and because that conduct is the primary focus of
the case, it seems best to discuss the case along with others in the
nonconsensual category. However, some of the statements in the case are
potentially relevant to situations involving consensual sexual relations
between attorney and client.
In 1999, Nicole Wattigney hired attorney Robert DeFrancesch to
represent her in connection with a misdemeanor drug possession charge.
She ultimately pleaded guilty to the charge. After the representation ended,
DeFrancesch and Wattigney had sexual relations on several occasions, in
exchange for which DeFrancesch provided financial assistance to
Wattigney. Thereafter, in 2001, Wattigney was charged with felony drug
possession. DeFrancesch agreed to handle the matter for $2,000, which
Wattigney was to pay in weekly installments. When Wattigney did not
make a payment that was due on October 15, DeFrancesch “proposed that
she accompany him to Mississippi for a sexual rendezvous as a
‘punishment’ for failing to pay timely.”136 In a later recorded conversation,
DeFrancesch
explained to Ms. Wattigney that she would be required to have sex
with him as a “punishment” for not paying her fee installments on
134. Id. at 823.
135. In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71 (La. 2004) (per curiam).
136. Id. at 72.
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time. Ms. Wattigney expressed reluctance to agree to respondent’s
demands, explaining that she had recently been engaged and was
“trying to make everything right” with her fiancé. Respondent
acknowledged that Ms. Wattigney might not be “enthused about
doing it,” but analogized his demand for sex “as a penalty fee, like,
[on a] Discover card.” Respondent told Ms. Wattigney that once
she took care of her “business,” then “we’ll be square and I’ll be
taking care of you again.” When Ms. Wattigney continued to
protest, respondent assured her that so long as she paid her fee
installments on time each week thereafter, “this will never happen
again, okay. But, if you miss, then that’s the punishment, that’s
the late fee, that’s the whatever you want to call it, okay.”137
In a subsequent recorded conversation, DeFrancesch withdrew his request
that Wattigney have sex with him. He appeared in court when Wattigney
entered a guilty plea in her criminal case.
The ODC charged DeFrancesch, among other things, with charging an
unreasonable fee, in violation of Rule 1.5(a); having a conflict of interest,
in violation of Rule 1.7(b); engaging in a prohibited transaction with a
client, in violation of Rule 1.8(a);138 failing to exercise independent
professional judgment, in violation of Rule 2.1; and engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d). The
hearing committee concluded that DeFrancesch had violated the rules as
charged.139
In its opinion in the case, the Louisiana Supreme Court compared the
attorney’s conduct to the conduct of attorneys in two earlier decisions, In
re Ashy,140a case that has already been discussed, and In re Gore,141 a case
that will be discussed later. In discussing the Ashy case, the court said, in
part:
We determined the lawyer’s conduct violated Rule 2.1, because
his sexual overtures to his client threatened his ability to exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.
Likewise, we identified a violation of the conflict of interest
137. Id.
138. Rule 1.8 has a number of subparts, setting forth different conflicts of
interest. The subpart that seems to have been relevant in this case was 1.8(a),
which imposes limitations on business transactions between the lawyer and the
client and which limits a lawyer from acquiring an ownership, possessory,
security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client.
139. Id. at 73.
140. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859 (La. 1999) (per curiam).
141. In re Gore, 752 So. 2d 853 (La. 2000) (per curiam).
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provisions in Rule 1.7(b), as the lawyer placed his own interests
ahead of his client’s interests by refusing to put forth his best
efforts unless the client responded to him sexually.142
Just as it had done in Touchet, the court, in referring to Ashy, focused
on Rules 1.7 and 2.1. Even though the hearing committee had concluded
that DeFrancesch had violated Rule 8.4(d), as charged by the ODC, the
court in DeFrancesch did not take the occasion to reinforce or to develop
the theories, mentioned in Ashy, that the lawyer in that case had engaged
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule
8.4(d); or that he had sexually exploited his client in a manner indicating
that he was unworthy of the confidence reposed in him by his client, in
violation of Rule 8.4.
In comparing the conduct of DeFrancesch to that of the lawyers in
Ashy and in Gore, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Although respondent’s misconduct is not identical to the
misconduct at issue in either Ashy or Gore, those cases provide us
with some guidance. As in Gore, respondent and Ms. Wattigney
had a prior consensual sexual relationship, although this
relationship had terminated by the time of the instant misconduct.
As in Ashy, there is an element of coercion in respondent’s implied
threat that he might cease to represent Ms. Wattigney if she did not
submit to the “sex as a penalty” arrangement; however, unlike Ashy,
respondent never threatened to limit his efforts on his client’s behalf
if she refused to engage in a sexual relationship with him. Indeed,
respondent correctly points out he ultimately withdrew his request
for sex and continued to represent Ms. Wattigney in her criminal
case until it was concluded to her satisfaction.
Nonetheless, as we observed in Ashy, the particular evil that results
from a lawyer’s sexual relationship with a client is the loss of
emotional detachment which in turn threatens the objectivity and
reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment. . . . The potential for harm which results
whenever a lawyer allows his personal interests to conflict with his
client’s interests is so great that any such violation must be viewed
as being very serious, even if actual harm is not readily
identifiable.143

142. In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d at 76.
143. Id. at 76–77.
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The court concluded that DeFrancesch had violated the rules as
charged by the ODC. It also concluded that a two-year suspension was
appropriate; however, because of mitigating factors, it deferred all but one
year and a day of the suspension.
The language, quoted above, about the “particular evil” warrants some
consideration. The court was referring to “the loss of emotional
detachment” that comes with a sexual relationship with a client. Inasmuch
as DeFrancesch did not actually enter into a new sexual relationship with
Wattigney, it is not obvious that the court actually needed to discuss this
“evil.” But it did so anyway, and its discussion indicates that the evil has
two different dimensions. First, the court mentioned that “the loss of
emotional detachment” that comes with a sexual relationship with a client,
“threatens the objectivity and reasonableness that form the basis of the
lawyer’s independent professional judgment.” That could result in a
violation of Rule 2.1. Second, the court mentioned “the potential for harm
which results whenever a lawyer allows his personal interests to conflict
with his client’s interests.” That could result in a violation of Rule 1.7.144
There is a suggestion in the court’s language that professional
misconduct inevitably results from a sexual relationship between a lawyer
and a client. The court did not say that the “particular evil” might result,
or sometimes results, from the sexual relationship. The court said that it
results. Moreover, the court immediately went on to say that “[t]he
potential for harm which results whenever a lawyer allows his personal
interests to conflict with his client’s interests is so great that any such
violation must be viewed as being very serious, even if actual harm is not
readily identifiable.”145 The word “violation” is not a trivial word in the
context of lawyer discipline. That violation arises from the conflict
between the lawyer’s personal interests and the interests of the client. It
arises, very seriously, according to the court, even if there is no readily
identifiable harm to the client. The potential for harm is enough. In this
case, it seems that the court might have been of the view that a sexual
relationship between the lawyer and the client amounts to misconduct per
se.
If a sexual relationship between the lawyer and the client amounts to
misconduct per se, that misconduct would occur regardless of whether the
client gave informed consent to the representation. This seems to be
consistent with a basic teaching of Model Rule 1.8(j), which renders the
conflict of interest resulting from sexual relations between the lawyer and
the client non-consentable. However, the court’s language in DeFrancesch
144. Id.
145. Id.
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may also go beyond that rule, because it is not necessarily limited to the
situation in which sexual relations commence after the attorney-client
relationship has been formed. If the “particular evil” referenced in
DeFrancesch were understood to arise whether or not the sexual
relationship antedates the attorney-client relationship, the calculus would
be different than the one used by the American Bar Association in Model
Rule 1.8(j). That is because the ABA rule prohibits “sexual relations with
a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them
when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”146
iv. In re Banks
The next case this Article will address is In re Banks.147 The ODC
charged Attorney Ronnie Banks with a number of acts of misconduct, only
one of which involved sexual misconduct. According to the reported
opinion,
Jacqueline Evans consulted respondent regarding the
representation of her son, Brandon Evans, who was facing felony
criminal charges. During this initial visit, respondent made
unwanted sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Evans, who
believed respondent was requesting sexual favors in exchange for
his representation of her son. Consequently, she decided not to
retain respondent.148
Banks visited Brandon in jail anyway and falsely told him that he had
been hired to be his lawyer. Evans filed a complaint with the ODC when
Banks sent her a bill for $1,250 and threatened collection efforts if she did
not pay it. Based on these events, the ODC charged Banks with having
engaged both in conflicts of interest, in violation of Rule 1.8,149 and in
146. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
147. In re Banks, 18 So. 3d 57 (La. 2009) (per curiam).
148. Id. at 61.
149. The reference to Rule 1.8 was probably erroneous. The rule has a number
of subparts, but none of them were referenced in the opinion. The disciplinary
board acknowledged that the ODC charged Banks with a violation of Rule 1.8,
but it noted that Rule 1.8 addresses “specific” conflicts of interest, while “Rule
1.7 is the general rule on conflicts of interests with current clients.” See In re
Ronnie Banks, Sr., 07-053, p. 16 (La. Att’y Disc. Bd. 2009),
https://www.ladb.org/DR/Default.aspx?DocID=6497&TAB=search&fname=ron
nie&lname=banks [https://perma.cc/97ME-S6S8]. It also noted that the hearing
committee had analyzed the situation under Rule 1.7 and concluded that it had
properly done so. Id. at 17.
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conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in
violation of Rule 8.4(c). The ODC also charged him with failing to
cooperate with its investigation.
Banks “did not address the encounter with Ms. Evans”150 before the
hearing committee. But the committee concluded that “Ms. Evans’
testimony was credible, and the gist of the charge was that respondent
made sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Evans and attempted to
sexually seduce her in his office.”151 The disciplinary board agreed, and
concluded: “Here, the record supports the Committee’s finding that
Respondent attempted to sexually seduce Ms. Evans, thereby putting his
personal interests ahead of the interests of his client. Therefore, the
Committee properly concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.7.”152
The just-quoted language indicates that both the disciplinary board
and the hearing committee considered Ms. Evans to be a “client” of the
disciplined lawyer. Inasmuch as Ms. Evans decided not to retain Banks as
an attorney, and inasmuch as it was her son who was facing felony charges,
it would be reasonable to question the conclusion that Ms. Evans was
Banks’s client. However, because the hearing committee and the
disciplinary board regarded Ms. Evans as a client for purposes of the
disciplinary proceedings, it seems appropriate to view the case as one
involving nonconsensual sexual conduct relating to a client.
Summarizing the attorney’s acts of misconduct in the case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court said:
Respondent has engaged in numerous instances of serious
attorney misconduct, including pleading no contest to
misdemeanor theft, making false statements to a trial judge,
charging excessive fees and/or failing to refund unearned fees,
failing to provide competent representation to his client,
neglecting legal matters, commingling and converting client
funds, making sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Evans and
lying to her son about his representation, and making false
statements to the ODC and otherwise failing to cooperate in its
investigations. The record supports the numerous rule violations
found by the disciplinary board.153

150. In re Banks, 18 So. 3d at 62.
151. Id.
152. See In re Banks, 07-053, p. 17 (La. Att’y Disc. Bd. 2009)
https://www.ladb.org/DR/Default.aspx?DocID=6497&TAB=search&fname=ron
nie&lname=banks [https://perma.cc/6Z7S-TZQU] (last visited August 7, 2020).
153. In re Banks, 18 So. 3d at 63.
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Without further discussion of the specific acts of misconduct, and in
light of several aggravating factors, the court ordered permanent
disbarment.
The Banks case does not break new ground. In the end, the court dealt
with the sexual misconduct element of the case—conduct that can be
perceived as amounting to sexual harassment of a client—as a conflict of
interest under Rule 1.7.154 That rule has been relevant to other sexual
misconduct cases in this category. If Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect
at the time of the decision, it would not have been violated, because the
lawyer did not have sexual relations with Ms. Evans. However, the court
might have utilized an indirect application of the rule. It might have
concluded that the attorney had attempted to violate Rule 1.8(j) by seeking
to have sexual relations with Ms. Evans. Such an attempted violation of
the rule could then have constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(a), which states
that it is professional misconduct to attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
v. In re Johnson
The last case in this category, and the one that will receive the least
amount of attention, is In re Johnson.155 It is a reciprocal discipline case,156
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court disciplined a Louisiana-admitted
lawyer for conduct in Missouri that could be considered sexual harassment
of a client.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted, in its opinion in the case, that
“the exact nature of respondent’s conduct is somewhat unclear based on
the limited information contained in the Missouri judgment.”157 But it said
that “the crux of the misconduct seems to be that respondent engaged in a
conflict of interest by showing his client lewd photographs and making
suggestive sexual comments to her, and commingled his personal funds
with trust funds in his operating account.”158 The notion that a lawyer

154. Ashy also referred to sexual harassment of client in conflict-of-interest
terms. See supra text accompanying note 109.
155. In re Johnson, 177 So. 3d 116 (La. 2015) (per curiam).
156. “Reciprocal discipline” refers to discipline in Louisiana that is based on a
disciplinary order from another jurisdiction. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, § 21 (2019).
157. In re Johnson, 177 So. 3d at 118.
158. Id. The court noted that there had been no finding that Johnson had
converted client funds.
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engages in a conflict of interest when the lawyer sexually harasses a client
is consistent with what the court said in Ashy and in Banks.159
The court said that it had been unable to find Louisiana cases
“involving a conflict of interest based solely upon a lawyer’s sexually
suggestive comments towards a client,”160 but it observed that it had
ordered “suspensions in the range of three to nine months, all or part of
which may be deferred” in cases of “consensual lawyer-client sexual
relationships.”161 The court also noted that, although the Missouri order
had been one for indefinite suspension, it had allowed the attorney to
reapply for admission within six months, “perhaps suggest[ing] [that
Missouri] did not find his conduct to be particularly egregious.”162 The
Louisiana Supreme Court did not disagree. Certainly, the conduct of the
lawyer was not as egregious as the lawyer’s conduct in Touchet, conduct
which resulted in disbarment. In Johnson, the court ordered indefinite
suspension,163 which is the same sanction that the Missouri disciplinary
authorities had imposed.
2. Consensual Sexual Relationship Cases
Now we turn to cases involving consensual sexual relationships. The
principal themes from the Ashy case have sounded in some of them. But
there have been other thematic developments as well.
a. Nonclients
One Louisiana case, In re Bordelon,164 features a consensual sexual
relationship between an attorney and a nonclient. In that case, Denise
159. See supra text accompanying notes 109 and 154. The ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct include a rule, Rule 8.4(g), that, among other things,
prohibits sexual harassment by lawyers. As of this writing, Louisiana has not
adopted Rule 8.4(g). But, as indicated, the Louisiana Supreme Court has imposed
discipline on Louisiana lawyers for engaging in sexual harassment of a client. Cf.
In re Wiegand, 704 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1997) (Louisiana-admitted lawyer was
subject to discipline for sexual harassment of employees).
160. In re Johnson, 177 So. 3d at 118.
161. Id. I will consider the consensual relationship cases in the next section of
the Article.
162. Id.
163. This is not a sanction that is specifically provided for in the applicable
Louisiana rules, but the court observed that “only under extraordinary
circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed
by the other jurisdiction.” Id. at 119.
164. In re Bordelon, 894 So. 2d 315 (La. 2005) (per curiam).
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Seidman contacted attorney Michael Bordelon about the status of a
personal injury matter that another lawyer was handling. She had
contacted Bordelon after she had been unable to reach the attorney who
was handling her case. But her original attorney resurfaced, and the
personal injury case settled.
Bordelon and Seidman thereafter commenced a consensual sexual
relationship that continued through the fall of 1992. During the time they
were involved in the sexual relationship, Bordelon asked whether Seidman
could “invest” some of her settlement money by loaning him $20,000 for
the down payment on a house. Seidman agreed to make the loan, and
Bordelon executed an unsecured promissory note in her favor. He
thereafter made some payments on the note.
In 1994, after the end of the consensual sexual relationship, the police
arrested Seidman on drug charges. She reached out to Bordelon, who
obtained her release from jail. She also moved into Bordelon’s residence
for several months. While there, Bordelon had her execute an affidavit
stating that the promissory note had been lost but that it had been paid in
full. Later, however, Seidman left Bordelon’s residence and demanded full
repayment of the loan balance. When Bordelon rejected her demand,
Seidman filed a complaint with the ODC, alleging, among other things,
that Bordelon had refused to repay the loan and that he had coerced her
into signing the lost note affidavit.
The ODC dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence that Bordelon
and Seidman had created an attorney-client relationship prior to the
signing of the note. It also found no evidence of coercion or duress in the
signing of the affidavit. However, the disciplinary board remanded the
matter to the ODC for further investigation. The ODC thereafter filed
formal charges, alleging, among other things, that Bordelon had breached
his duty of loyalty to his client, in violation of Rule 1.7(b); had engaged in
a prohibited business transaction with a client, in violation of Rule 1.8(a);
and had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c). The ODC also alleged that
Bordelon had violated Rule 8.1(a) by making misrepresentations in the
disciplinary investigation.165
It is not entirely clear from the case whether, or to what extent, the
sexual relationship between Bordelon and Seidman figured into the formal
charges. It is possible that the alleged violation of Rule 1.7(b) was based,
at least in part, on the existence of the sexual relationship, but the ODC
165. That rule prohibits lawyers from knowingly making false statements of
material fact in connection with a bar admission application or a disciplinary
matter. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 8.1(a) (2018).
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filed those charges prior to the time the Ashy case was handed down. Given
the seminal nature of the Ashy case, there was not any significant
Louisiana jurisprudence on attorney-client sexual relationships at the time
the ODC filed the formal charges, and the ODC might not have been
looking at the sexual relationship through a conflict-of-interest lens. It is
possible that the 1.7(b)-conflict-of-interest allegations related more to the
borrowing of money from the client than to the existence of the sexual
relationship.166 However, in response to the formal charges, Bordelon
denied that he had ever had an attorney-client relationship with Seidman,
and he refused to admit or deny that he had had a sexual affair with
Seidman, on the ground that issue was “immaterial, as there was never an
attorney-client relationship.”167 There would have been little reason to
deny the existence of the affair unless the ODC had claimed that there was
one.
As it turns out, however, the ultimate focus in the case was neither on
the sexual relationship nor on the borrowing. When the case reached the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the focus was on the existence of the attorneyclient relationship:
The record supports the finding made by the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board that no attorney/client relationship
existed between respondent and Ms. Seidman. While it is true as
a general principle that the existence of an attorney/client
relationship “turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it
exists,”. . . we conclude that in this case, Ms. Seidman could not
have reasonably formed a subjective belief that respondent was
acting as her attorney. Ms. Seidman consulted with respondent
concerning a personal injury suit that had been tried in federal
court, and after an appeal, remanded for a new trial on damages
only if Ms. Seidman would not accept a reduction of the award.
Respondent told Ms. Seidman that he was not capable of handling
the matter and that he would assist her in finding a lawyer to retry the case. While respondent was in the process of doing this,
Ms. Seidman accepted a settlement of the case through her
original attorney, without respondent’s input. Clearly, no
attorney/client relationship existed under these facts. Moreover, as
a practical matter we find it is telling that Ms. Seidman mentioned
nothing about an attorney/client relationship in her original
complaint to the ODC; she characterized her relationship with
166. Regardless, the alleged violation of Rule 1.8(a), the business-transactionwith-client rule, did relate to the borrowing.
167. In re Bordelon, 894 So. 2d at 318.
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respondent as that of “a friend.” Ms. Seidman did not begin to
claim that she thought respondent was her attorney until after the
ODC dismissed the complaint, citing the absence of an
attorney/client relationship as the basis of its determination that
no professional misconduct occurred.168
In the absence of an attorney-client relationship, the court concluded
that it should dismiss the formal charges dealing with violations of 1.7(b)
and 1.8(a). However, the court found that Bordelon had made false
statements in the disciplinary proceedings with respect to the repayment
of the loan, and it concluded that he had thereby violated Rules 8.1(a) and
8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Consequently, it ordered a 60day suspension.
Although it is clear from the court’s recitation of the facts of the case
that there had been a sexual relationship between Bordelon and Seidman,
that sexual relationship was not material to the disciplinary outcome. It
appears that the sexual relationship was not material because there had
been no attorney-client relationship between the parties during the relevant
time. If that is so, one of the teachings of the case is that, in the absence of
an attorney-client relationship, a consensual sexual relationship between a
lawyer and another person, without more, does not amount to professional
misconduct. This is not a surprising outcome.
b. Clients
There have also been Louisiana disciplinary cases involving
consensual sexual relationships between lawyers and their clients. Cases
in this category are ones to which Model Rule 1.8(j) would have been
applicable if it had been adopted in Louisiana at the relevant time.
However, the absence of that rule did not mean that the attorneys were
able to escape discipline. On one ground or another, the lawyers in the
reported cases were found to have engaged in professional misconduct.
i. In re Schambach
The earliest of the consensual sexual relationship cases, decided a year
after the Ashy decision, is In re Schambach.169 Beginning in 1985,
Attorney Robert Schambach represented Dianna Womble in several
matters. After the attorney-client relationship had been in place for a few
years, Schambach “began engaging in an extra-marital affair with Ms.
168. Id. at 322.
169. In re Schambach, 726 So. 2d 892 (La. 1999) (per curiam).
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Womble.”170 Thereafter, in 1991, Schambach borrowed $40,000 from
Womble, in two separate transactions, and gave her a promissory note. By
1993, the personal relationship between Schambach and Womble had
deteriorated. She filed suit to recover on the promissory note. She also
filed a complaint with the ODC, claiming that Schambach had taken
“advantage of his position as her attorney by luring her into an illicit sexual
affair during a vulnerable period in her life and borrowing over $40,000 in
funds and failing to repay her.”171 After an investigation, the ODC filed
charges, primarily alleging that Schambach had violated the conflict of
interest prohibition of Rule 1.7, and the prohibition in Rule 1.8(a) against
entering into business transactions with clients.
The hearing committee found that Schambach had “acted wrongfully
in having a sexual affair with his client and in entering into a business
transaction with her.”172 It recommended an 18-month suspension. The
disciplinary board recommended a year-long suspension instead.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court thought that the sanction should
be more severe. It noted that neither the hearing committee nor the
disciplinary board had had the benefit of its decision in Ashy at the time
they had rendered their decisions. The court described the Ashy opinion in
this way:
In Ashy, we imposed a two year suspension on an attorney who
attempted to develop a sexual relationship with a female client in
exchange for making certain efforts on her behalf as her lawyer.
We found that although sexual relations or sexual misconduct with
a client was not specifically addressed in the present Rules of
Professional Conduct, such conduct could violate several existing
rules. For example, applying Rule 1.7(b), we found sexual
harassment of a client could adversely affect the quality of
representation by undermining the client’s trust in the attorney.
Likewise, applying Rule 2.1, we found a sexual relationship could
impair the lawyer’s objectivity and independent professional
judgment.173
In this case, decided a year after Ashy, the court did not explicitly refer to
the violations of Rule 8.4 that it had found in Ashy.
170. Id. at 893.
171. Id. Womble’s allegation, expressed in this way, appears to raise an issue
about whether the sexual relationship was actually consensual. But that issue was
not explored in the case.
172. Id. at 894.
173. Id. at 895–96.
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As in Ashy, the court noted that the personal interests of the lawyer
had interfered with his professional responsibilities, but it seemed to focus
most of its attention on the financial burdens that Schambach had imposed
on his client:
Although the instant case, involving a consensual relationship, is
distinguishable in some ways from Ashy, we find that respondent
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by allowing his
personal relationship with Ms. Womble to interfere with his
professional responsibilities toward her. During his on-going
representation of Ms. Womble, respondent borrowed a substantial
sum of money (originating from funds he had previously
recovered on her behalf as her attorney) from her when he knew
she was disabled and in a vulnerable position. He then discharged
this debt in bankruptcy, leaving Ms. Womble with virtually no
funds for her living expenses and forcing her to file for
bankruptcy. Respondent made no effort to make restitution to Ms.
Womble until the eve of the disciplinary hearing in this case.
Although we recognize that Ms. Womble ultimately testified on
respondent’s behalf at the hearing, the marked change in her
testimony from statements in her earlier complaint, especially in
light of respondent’s payment of restitution, calls into question the
credibility of her hearing testimony. Taken as a whole, we find the
record supports the conclusion that respondent violated his duties
to Ms. Womble, and this violation resulted in serious harm to
her.174
The court ordered a three-year suspension, which was more severe than
the two-year suspension handed down in Ashy.
In what way did the sexual relationship with Womble interfere with
the attorney’s professional responsibilities toward her? There is no
indication that Schambach had provided deficient legal services to
Womble. Nor is there explicit mention, in Rule 1.7 terms, that the sexual
relationship with the client had created a substantial risk that Schambach’s
representation of Womble would be materially limited by his personal
interests. Given that the court had earlier stated, in referring to Ashy, that
a sexual relationship with a client “could adversely affect the quality of
representation by undermining the client’s trust in the attorney”175 it does
not appear that the court regarded this risk as an inevitable consequence of

174. Id. at 896.
175. Id. at 895.
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a sexual relationship between lawyer and client. As we have seen, the
opinion in DeFrancesch can be read to articulate a different proposition.176
In contrast, the case for a violation of Rule 1.8(a), the business
transaction with client rule, could have been quite strong, but the court
does not refer to the elements of that rule in its analysis.177 The court seems
to have been more focused on the financial exploitation of the client that
was facilitated by the existence of the sexual relationship. Stated another
way, it seems that the concern was not so much that the attorney was using
his attorney-client relationship to sexually exploit his client, but that the
attorney was using the sexual relationship to financially exploit his client.
What if Schambach had fully complied with Rule 1.8(a) in borrowing
money from Womble? In other words, suppose that the borrowing had
been fair and reasonable to Womble; that Schambach had advised
Womble, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of
independent legal counsel in connection with the borrowing; that Womble
had given informed written consent to the transactions; and that the other
requirements of the rule had been fully satisfied.178 Would Schambach
then have been a candidate for discipline? It is not obvious that he would
have been. The court does not state, in Schambach, that a consensual
sexual relationship with a client, without more, is a ground for discipline.

176. See supra text accompanying note 145.
177. Rule 1.8(a) states:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood
by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client,
to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in
the transaction.
LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (2018).
178. It might have been difficult to satisfy all of these requirements.
Schambach might have wanted to borrow money from Womble instead of from a
bank precisely because the transactions and their terms would been more
advantageous to him. In addition, Womble’s vulnerability might have interfered
with her ability to give informed consent.
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Schambach is a case in which Rule 1.8(j) could have made a difference
in the analysis if not in the ultimate sanction. Schambach had entered into
a consensual sexual relationship with Womble after their attorney-client
relationship had come into being. That clearly would have violated the
model rule, and the court would have said so had the rule been in place at
the time.
ii. In re Gore
The issue of consensual sexual relationships with clients surfaced
again in the 2000 case of In re Gore.179 According to the reported opinion:
Brenda Sanders retained respondent [Brent Gore] in 1990 to
represent her in various business matters. In the course of the
representation, respondent and Ms. Sanders entered into a
consensual sexual relationship. In November 1991, respondent
filed a petition for divorce on Ms. Sanders’ behalf, and he
represented her until a final judgment of divorce was rendered in
May 1992.180
The series of relationships appears to go like this: initially, there was only
an attorney-client relationship; thereafter, while the attorney-client
relationship continued, a sexual relationship commenced; thereafter, while
the sexual relationship continued, the lawyer undertook a new matter on
behalf of the client.
Sanders ended up filing a complaint against Gore with the ODC.
Initially, the ODC was disinclined to initiate formal disciplinary
proceedings. A footnote in the case states:
The record reflects that following its investigation of Ms. Sanders’
complaint, the ODC rejected formal charges against respondent in
March 1995, concluding that an attorney/client relationship of a
sexual nature, standing alone, did not violate any existing rule of
professional conduct in Louisiana. Although the hearing
committee affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the same
ground, a panel of the disciplinary board ultimately reversed.181

179. In re Gore, 752 So. 2d 853 (La. 2000) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 854.
181. Id. at 855 n.2.
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The ODC did not regard an attorney-client sexual relationship,
standing alone,182 to be problematic. The hearing committee apparently
agreed. However, the board reversed, and the ODC thereafter filed formal
charges, alleging violations of several rules:
The ODC alleges that at no time during the representation did
respondent inform Ms. Sanders that a potential conflict of interest
existed, in violation of Rules 1.4(b) (failure to communicate with
a client), 1.7(b) (conflict of interest), 1.16(d) (termination of the
representation), 2.1 (failure to exercise independent professional
judgment in representing a client), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. The ODC further alleges that at the time
respondent filed a Motion for Judgment of Divorce on Ms.
Sanders’ behalf, alleging that Ms. Sanders and her husband had
lived separate and apart for more than six months, he knew that
Ms. Sanders and her husband still lived together; that he
misrepresented these facts to the court; and that he failed to correct
the misrepresentation. The ODC asserts this conduct violated
Rules 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in
representing a client), 1.7(b), 3.1 (bringing a claim without a good
faith basis for doing so), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4
(fairness toward opposing parties and counsel), 8.4(a), 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.183
At this point in the proceedings, this was no longer a case of a consensual
sexual relationship with a client, standing alone.

182. One might question whether a sexual relationship with a client can ever
really “stand alone.” If the attorney is providing legal services to the client, the
sexual relationship could have an effect on the professional relationship and the
professional services rendered. See In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71, 77 (La.
2004) (per curiam). If the relationship is nonconsensual, there would be other
issues. See id.; In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859, 867–68 (La. 1998).
183. In re Gore, 752 So. 2d at 854 (footnote omitted). Later, the ODC added a
third count to the formal charges, alleging that Gore had, among other things,
“engaged in improper communications with a judge and knowingly assisted a
judge in conduct violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct.” Id. at 854 n.1.
However, the ODC ultimately dismissed this third count for lack of clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
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Gore ended up filing a petition for consent discipline in which he
admitted a violation of Rule 1.7. According to the opinion in the case:
Following the institution of formal charges, respondent filed a
petition for consent discipline. In his petition, respondent admits
that he began representing Ms. Sanders in early 1990 in
connection with a variety of business matters. At some point
thereafter, respondent and Ms. Sanders began a consensual sexual
relationship. In late 1991, respondent represented Ms. Sanders in
connection with her divorce from her husband, whom she alleged
was abusing her. Although Ms. Sanders desired the divorce
(which was uncontested by her husband) and consented to
respondent’s representation of her, respondent admits that he
failed to advise his client that a potential conflict of interest
existed, in violation of Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.184
Gore proposed a six-month suspension, followed by two years of
supervised probation, subject to some conditions.
The disciplinary board recommended acceptance of the proposed
consent discipline. It was of the view that, although Gore had been
involved in an attorney-client sexual relationship that had given rise to a
conflict of interest, he had not “take[n] advantage of the relationship,” as
had the lawyers in Ashy and in Schambach.185 The Louisiana Supreme
Court agreed:
Respondent has admitted that he engaged in the misconduct set
forth in the petition for consent discipline. Although the instant
case involves a sexual relationship between respondent and his
client, it is nonetheless distinguishable from Ashy and Schambach,
as there is no allegation that respondent attempted to use his
position as attorney to coerce sex or money from Ms. Sanders.
Nonetheless, we agree that the relationship had the potential to
create a conflict of interest, especially in light of the fact that
respondent was representing Ms. Sanders in connection with a
divorce proceeding. Based on our review of the record, we find
the proposed consent discipline is appropriate under the
184. Id. at 854. Rule 1.7 is the basic conflict-of-interest rule. The version that
was in effect at the time of the Gore decision was somewhat different from the
current rule, but the differences are not material for purposes of this article.
185. Id. at 855. There was also evidence that Sanders was far from an
unwilling participant in the sexual relationship with Gore. Id. at 855 n.4.
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circumstances.186
The opinion states that Sanders “consented” to Gore’s representation
of her in the divorce matter while they were involved in a sexual
relationship.187 She was willing to allow her sexual partner to be her
lawyer. There is no suggestion of “exploitation” by Gore. However, the
opinion notes that Gore failed to advise Sanders of the potential conflict
of interest involved in his representation of Sanders in the divorce case
while he was involved in a sexual relationship with her.188 What if he had
advised her? More particularly, what if Gore, in compliance with the
requirements of Rule 1.7, had advised her of the risk that the representation
could be limited by his personal interest in the sexual relationship, and had
obtained her consent to the representation?
In order to do this, Gore would have had to reasonably believe that the
representation of Sanders in the divorce case would not have been
adversely affected by his own interests. Would such a belief have been
reasonable? There is reason to question that.189 The sexual relationship
with the lawyer might, for example, have complicated the divorce case,
perhaps by providing some litigation advantages to a spouse who
186. Id. at 856.
187. Id. at 854.
188. Id.
189. See In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833 (Wash. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on
other grounds, In re Anschell, 69 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). In Halverson,
the Washington Supreme Court considered whether it was reasonable for an
attorney to believe that his representation of a client in a divorce would not be
adversely affected by his later-arising sexual relationship with the client:
It was not objectively reasonable for Halverson to believe that the
representation would not be adversely affected by the sexual
relationship, nor did Halverson disclose to Wickersham the risks
involved or the material implications of the sexual relationship upon the
dissolution proceeding. Consequently, Halverson’s failure to obtain
written consent was more than a mere technical violation of the rule.
Halverson should have known that discovery of the affair could worsen
the relationship between Wickersham and Sarles and, thus, unnecessarily
complicate the dissolution proceeding. Further, Halverson should have
known that the affair could impact the custody determination of
Wickersham’s daughter. Finally, Halverson should have known that
discovery of the affair by his wife might lead to his withdrawal as
Wickersham’s attorney. Thus, Halverson’s subjective belief that the
relationship would not adversely affect the representation was not
objectively reasonable.
Id. at 840.
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discovered the relationship.190 Moreover, in order to comply with the
provisions of Rule 1.7, Sanders would also need to have given her
informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. Could she
have done so? There is reason to question whether a client who becomes
involved in a sexual relationship with a lawyer is fully capable of
providing informed consent to the representation.191 That might be
especially true in a divorce situation, where the client might be regarded
as “vulnerable.” Gore does not attempt to provide answers to these
“questions.”
If Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect at the relevant time, the case likely
would have proceeded differently. Gore would have violated the rule by
entering into a sexual relationship with Sanders while he had an ongoing
attorney-client relationship with her. He could not have entered into the
sexual relationship with the informed consent of the client, because, as we
have seen, Model Rule 1.8(j) is “non-consentable.”
Later on, while the sexual relationship continued, and when Sanders
asked Gore to take on her divorce case, other considerations would have
come into play. As the court stated in its opinion in the case, the
“relationship,” meaning the sexual relationship, “had the potential to
create a conflict of interest, especially in light of the fact that respondent
190. See, e.g., id.; Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Knudsen, 444 P.3d 72 (Wyo. 2019)
(client, with whom lawyer was having a sexual relationship, expressed anxiety
that the sexual relationship, if discovered, would be detrimental to her divorce
case); In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569, 579 (La. 2014) (per curiam) (Knoll, J.,
concurring) (“Depending upon the stage of the underlying proceeding, the sexual
relationship could raise fault issues and impair the former spouse’s ability to seek
support. By interjecting himself into the former client’s personal life, the lawyer
might be transformed into a witness in the proceeding. At the very least, the
relationship might increase acrimony between the spouses and impact issues such
as child support and property settlements.”).
191. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983) (“Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because
the client’s own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could
give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual
relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.”); see also Malinda L.
Seymore, Attorney-Client Sex: A Feminist Critique of the Absence of Regulation,
15 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 175, 179 (2003) (noting the argument that there cannot
be real consent in the unbalanced relationship between attorney and client); Awad,
supra note 18, at 132–33 (saying that attorney-client relationship is inherently
unequal and that in most cases, especially emotionally charged ones, it is unlikely
that the client could give consent); Vincent, supra note 18, at 652–53 (suggesting
some requirements for consent to be “informed”).

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 148

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LOUISIANA LAWYERS

821

was representing Ms. Sanders in connection with a divorce proceeding.”192
The court did not get into specifics; however, as suggested above, one of
the risks of representing a client in a divorce case while the attorney and
the client are involved in a sexual relationship is that the sexual
relationship can create complications in the divorce case. Looking at this
through the lens of Rule 1.7, Gore should have considered whether his
representation of Sanders in her divorce case would have been materially
limited by his personal interest in continuing the sexual relationship with
her.
The foregoing discussion indicates that Model Rule 1.8(j) could have
made a difference had it been in effect at the time of the Gore case. But it
would not have made all the difference. There would still have been the
potential conflict of interest in taking on the divorce case at the same time
that the sexual relationship was going on. Rule 1.7 would still have been
applicable. And it would have been violated, because Gore admitted that
he had not advised Sanders about the potential conflict of interest.
iii. In re Ryland
Not every Louisiana case involving consensual sexual relationships
between lawyers and clients has resulted in significant disciplinary
sanctions. If the actual harm to the client is relatively minimal, even if the
court concludes that the relationship involved a conflict of interest, the
sanction could be relatively minimal. That was the outcome in In re
Ryland,193 a case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court imposed a fully
deferred 90-day suspension on a lawyer who had entered into a consensual
sexual relationship with a client and little or no actual harm had resulted.
Attorney Darrel Ryland represented Anita Gremillion in a domestic
relations matter. The day after the judge signed a consent judgment as to
child custody and support, but while the legal representation in the
domestic matter continued, Ryland and Gremillion entered into a
consensual sexual relationship. The affair lasted several months. When it
ended, Ryland withdrew from his representation of Gremillion in the
domestic matter. He self-reported to the ODC. Gremillion also filed a
complaint with the ODC.
The ODC alleged that Ryland’s conduct had violated Rule 1.7(a)(2),
conflict of interest, and 8.4(a) violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Ryland admitted that his conduct had violated the rules. He also
conceded that his misconduct had “presented a risk of potential harm to
192. In re Gore, 752 So. 2d at 856.
193. In re Ryland, 985 So. 2d 71 (La. 2008) (per curiam).
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Ms. Gremillion.”194 However, the hearing committee concluded that
“there was no clear and convincing evidence of any actual harm.”195 At the
next level in the process, the disciplinary board
found that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client
by entering into a sexual relationship with her, which constitutes
a prohibited conflict of interest. While there was potential for great
harm to Ms. Gremillion in terms of custody, parental fitness,
visitation, and community property, there is no evidence in the
record that she suffered any actual harm due to her relationship
with respondent.196
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Ryland had
“violated Rules 1.7 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,” as
the ODC had charged, “by engaging in a consensual sexual relationship
with a client whom he was representing in a divorce matter.”197 It said that
“[t]his conduct had the potential to cause harm” to the client.198
We should note two things about this conclusion. First, it is fairly
narrowly focused in terms of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The court
found that Ryland’s consensual sexual relationship had created a conflict
of interest under Rule 1.7. Rule 8.4(a) does not articulate an additional
behavioral standard; it simply defines “professional misconduct” to
include violations or attempted violations of the other rules. There was no
discussion of Rule 2.1, on professional independence; Rule 8.4(d), on
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; or Rule 8.4, for
conduct that sexually exploited the client in a manner indicating that the
lawyer was unworthy of the confidence reposed in him by his client. With
respect to a consensual sexual relationship with a client that caused no
actual harm, the focus was on the conflict of interest.
Second, the court’s conclusion used a word formula that is different
from the one we saw in Gore. In that case, the court had said that the sexual
relationship “had the potential to create a conflict of interest.”199 In this
case, the court said that entering into a sexual relationship with the client
“constitute[d] a prohibited conflict of interest.”200 It appears that the court

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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considered the sexual relationship with the divorce client to be a conflict
of interest per se.
The court then turned to the matter of the sanction. It considered some
of its earlier cases involving lawyer sexual impropriety such as Ashy,
Schambach, Touchet, Gore, and DeFrancesch. The court quoted from its
opinion in DeFrancesch, giving emphasis to some of the words:
Nonetheless, as we observed in Ashy, the particular evil that
results from a lawyer’s sexual relationship with a client is the loss
of emotional detachment which in turn threatens the objectivity
and reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment. . . . The potential for harm which results
whenever a lawyer allows his personal interests to conflict with
his client’s interests is so great that any such violation must be
viewed as being very serious, even if actual harm is not readily
identifiable. The baseline sanction for this misconduct is a
suspension from the practice of law.201
When we encountered this language earlier, we noted that it seems to
incorporate a misconduct-per-se element. The language indicates that the
particular evil results from a lawyer’s sexual relationship with the client.
In the present context, the court emphasized the seriousness of the
resulting violation. The violation, it said, “must be viewed as being very
serious.” Nonetheless, the sanction that the court imposed in Ryland was
not all that severe:
Based upon this jurisprudence, we find that the fully deferred
suspension recommended in this matter is appropriate. Like the
respondent in Gore, respondent did not cause actual harm to his
client as a result of their sexual relationship, nor did he threaten to
limit his efforts on her behalf unless she agreed to the sexual
relationship. However, this case does not involve the additional
misconduct seen in Gore, and thus does not warrant the period of
actual suspension we imposed in that case.202

201. Id. at 75–76 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 76. The court ordered a conditional, fully deferred 90-day
suspension. In Gore, the sanction had been a six-month suspension, followed by
two years of supervised probation. The “additional misconduct” in Gore was
probably Gore’s admitted violation of Rule 1.3 for not having been more diligent
in investigating factual representations made by his client. See In re Gore, 752 So.
2d at 854.
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If Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect at the time of the Ryland case,
Ryland would have violated it. He admitted that he had had sexual
relations with a client. However, the application of the rule likely would
not have yielded a different outcome. After all, the court in Ryland
concluded that, by entering into a sexual relationship with his client,
Ryland had engaged in a conflict of interest. Model Rule 1.8(j) is a
conflict-of-interest rule. And the court in Ryland referred to its earlier
teaching in DeFrancesch about the need to view the violation as “very
serious, even if actual harm is not readily identifiable.”203 A serious
conflict of interest is likely the same conclusion that would have resulted
from a violation of Rule 1.8(j).
iv. In re Yokum
In 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered In re Yokum,204 a
case in which the ODC had charged attorney Leonard Yokum with several
counts of misconduct, including misconduct related to a sexual
relationship with a client. According to the opinion, Yokum began a
consensual sexual relationship with client Angela Spiers while he
continued to provide legal services to her and to Extreme Auto Mart, Inc.,
a corporation in which both Yokum and Spiers had interests. Based on
this, the ODC charged Yokum with violating Rule 1.7(a), the basic conflict
of interest rule. The hearing committee, in a finding that was cited with
apparent approval in the opinion, said that “[t]he relationship with Ms.
Spiers not only created apparent conflicts of interest between respondent
and her, it permitted Ms. Spiers to become deeply involved in the daily
operation of respondent’s law practice and adversely affected a number of
his other professional relationships.”205
The opinion states, with respect to Spiers’s impact on Yokum’s law
practice, that
perhaps the most significant evidence of Ms. Spiers’ impact on
respondent’s law practice is seen in Count IX. In that matter,
respondent induced Mr. Delaney, in his capacity as the executor
of his sister’s succession, not only to “invest” in Extreme Auto
Mart but also to loan a substantial amount of money to Ms. Spiers
so that she could purchase a residence in Mississippi.
Respondent’s principal motivation for this transaction was to get
Ms. Spiers out of his life after their relationship soured; it had
203. In re Ryland, 985 So. 2d at 75 (emphasis removed).
204. In re Yokum, 85 So. 3d 645 (La. 2012) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 655.
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nothing to do with Mr. Delaney’s best interests.206
The ODC alleged, among other things, that Yokum had thereby again
violated Rule 1.7(a), and had violated Rule 1.8(a), the rule on business
transactions with clients, as well. The hearing committee concluded, in a
finding cited with apparent approval by the Louisiana Supreme Court, that
Yokum had “used his fiduciary relationship with Mr. Delaney to foster his
own personal motives, failed to disclose the romantic and business
relationship he had with Ms. Spiers, and, thus, misled Mr. Delaney into
loaning money to Ms. Spiers’ business and to purchase the real estate in
Mississippi.”207 As it turned out, Spiers defaulted on these obligations
“fairly quickly.”208
Although the hearing committee generally agreed with Yokum’s
claim that his sexual relationship with Spiers had not adversely affected
his independent judgment in advising her in her personal legal affairs or
those of Extreme Auto Mart, that did not eliminate the conflict of interest.
In a footnote that cited the Ryland case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
observed “that in prior cases, this court has held that a violation of Rule
1.7 occurs when a lawyer engages in a consensual sexual relationship with
a client, regardless of whether the conflict of interest caused actual harm
to the client.”209 In this instance, the relationship with Spiers had led to
problems, like the transactions with Delaney. For the various acts of
misconduct described in the opinion, the court ordered a three-year
suspension.
The Yokum case does not reflect any new developments in the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach to consensual sexual relationship
cases. Instead, it confirms the important teaching of In re Ryland that a
consensual sexual relationship results in a conflict of interest. It also
demonstrates how a consensual sexual relationship between a lawyer and
a client can result in problems for clients other than the one involved in
the relationship.
v. In re Martin
The most recent of the consensual-sexual-relationship-with-client
cases is In re Martin.210 There, Shelley Martin represented a client
identified as “M.S.” and her husband “W.S” in farming and business
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
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matters. During the representation, Martin “commenced a sexual
relationship with W.S. and introduced him to the drug culture in which she
was engaged.”211 According to the reported opinion, Martin’s conduct
“resulted in the acrimonious divorce of M.S. and W.S.”212 In subsequent
disciplinary proceedings, the ODC alleged that Martin’s conduct, as
described above, had violated Rules 1.7 and 8.4(a).213 These are the same
rules that were relevant in Ryland.
Martin was engaged in other instances of misconduct as well, some of
them criminally related. One of these arose out of an arrest after Martin
and W.S. had been “caught by police in a bathroom of the Lamar Dixon
Center in possession of cocaine, crack cocaine, and a crack pipe.”214 Based
on this event, the ODC charged Martin with violations of Rules 8.4(a), for
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct; 8.4(b), for commission of a
criminal act; and 8.4(d), for conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.215
Martin did not answer the formal charges, so the ODC’s factual
allegations were deemed admitted. The Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that the record supported a finding that Martin had committed
various acts of misconduct, including engaging in a sexual relationship
with a client.216 It ordered disbarment.
Although the court clearly considered Martin’s sexual relationship
with the client to be disciplinable, it did not discuss the issue in any detail.
By this point in the development of the Louisiana sexual misconduct cases,
perhaps there was little need to have done so.
vi. Consent Discipline Cases and an Operative Louisiana “Rule”
In addition to the consensual sexual relationship cases discussed
above, and In re Fuerst,217 which will be discussed in the next section of
this Article, in recent years there have been several “consent discipline”218
cases in which the Louisiana Supreme Court disciplined Louisiana
lawyers for entering into consensual sexual relationships with clients.
211. Id. at 869.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 870.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 872.
217. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569 (La. 2014) (per curiam).
218. These are cases in which the ODC and the attorney file a joint motion that
includes, among other things, stipulations of fact, conditional admission of rules
violated, and the agreed-upon discipline. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, § 20 (2019).
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Because these cases are very brief and do not discuss the sexual
misconduct of the lawyers in any detail, there is no need to discuss them
individually. However, there are nonetheless some things to note about
them.
The cases in question were decided from 2004 through 2014. In the
five most recent consent discipline cases, each lawyer admitted to having
engaged in a conflict of interest after the ODC had commenced an
investigation into allegations that the lawyer had entered into a consensual
sexual relationship with a client.219 In the sixth and earliest of the cases,
the attorney and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline
after the ODC had commenced an investigation into allegations that the
lawyer had engaged in a sexual relationship with a client, had prepared a
will for a client naming the lawyer’s wife as a legatee, and had engaged in
other conflicts of interest.220
The five most recent consent discipline cases confirm that the current
disciplinary landscape is considerably different than it was prior to the
Gore decision in 2000. We should recall that, in Gore, the ODC initially
did not seek formal discipline against the attorney, “concluding that an
attorney/client relationship of a sexual nature, standing alone, did not
violate any existing rule of professional conduct in Louisiana.”221 A few
years later, in Ryland, the court said the attorney had “violated Rules 1.7
and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in a
consensual sexual relationship with a client whom he was representing in a
divorce matter.”222 Thereafter, the Yokum decision confirmed the essential
teaching of Ryland that a consensual sexual relationship with a client
results in a conflict of interest. In addition, in the five most recent consent
discipline cases, one of which223 the court decided two years before
219. See In re Kendig, 140 So. 3d 1165 (La. 2014) (per curiam); In re Becnel,
99 So. 3d 1005 (La. 2012) (per curiam); In re Adams, 23 So. 3d 894 (La. 2009)
(per curiam); In re Prendergast, 23 So. 3d 894 (La. 2009) (per curiam); In re
Boellert, 926 So. 2d 492 (La. 2006) (per curiam). In In re Boellert, the lawyer also
admitted to a violation of Rule 2.1. In re Boellert 926 So. 2d 492.
220. In re Fadaol, 873 So. 2d 649 (La. 2004) (per curiam). There have also
been a couple of cases in which attorneys submitted petitions for permanent
resignation from the practice of law, in lieu of discipline, after the ODC had
commenced investigations into allegations that they had entered into sexual
relationships with clients. See In re Stewart, 253 So. 3d 1275 (La. 2018); In re
Karam, 872 So. 2d 466 (La. 2004) (there were additional allegations of
misconduct in Karam).
221. In re Gore, 752 So. 2d 853, 855 n.2 (La. 2000) (per curiam).
222. In re Ryland, 985 So. 2d 71, 73–74 (La. 2008) (per curiam).
223. In re Boellert, 926 So. 2d 492.
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Ryland, the court did not even engage in a discussion of the problems
associated with consensual sexual relationships between lawyers and their
clients. After the ODC began its investigation, the lawyers in those cases
were willing to stipulate that they had engaged in a conflict of interest. As
a practical matter, it could be said, based on these consent discipline cases,
and on Ryland and Yokum, that the operative “rule” in Louisiana is that
lawyers who engage in consensual sexual relationships with clients
thereby engage in a conflict of interest. That is the same outcome that we
would expect to see from an application of Model Rule 1.8(j), which is
itself a conflict of interest rule.
The conflict of interest articulated in Model Rule 1.8(j) is nonconsentable. If the operative rule in Louisiana is indeed the one described
in the foregoing paragraph, does it include that concept? Or, looking at the
issue in reverse, could a Louisiana lawyer who proposes to establish a
consensual sexual relationship with a client avoid discipline by making
pertinent disclosures, obtaining the informed consent of the client, and
otherwise satisfying the requirements of Rule 1.7(b)? That is not yet clear.
In Gore, the Louisiana Supreme Court referred to the attorney’s failure to
make disclosures to his client as being problematic, which could indicate
that the conflict was consentable. However, the court did not bring this up
in Ryland or mention it in the consent discipline cases. In the next case
that we will take up, In re Fuerst,224 Justice Knoll wrote, in concurrence,
that “[w]hen a sexual relationship arises during the course of the
representation, immediate termination of the attorney-client relationship is
a mandatory step in ameliorating the harm to the client’s legal interests.”225
To the extent that Justice Knoll’s view were to prevail, it would seem to
leave little room for the notion that a Louisiana lawyer who proposes to
undertake a consensual sexual relationship with a client could avoid a
conflict of interest by obtaining the informed consent of the client.

224. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569 (La. 2014) (per curiam).
225. Id. at 578. Cf. Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 268
(5th Cir. 2001). The attorney who had been involved in a consensual sexual
relationship with a client was later subject to a motion for disqualification in
litigation on behalf of the client; the court rejected the motion, noting that the
sexual relationship had ended before the litigation began, and that the client had
consented to the representation after full disclosure. The court said that “[p]rior
sexual relationships do not give rise to the type of ethical violation requiring
disqualification under the rules.” Id.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 156

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LOUISIANA LAWYERS

829

c. Prospective Clients, Former Clients, and Imputed Disqualification
Previously, in the consensual-sexual-relationship category of cases,
this Article has discussed cases involving sexual relationships with
nonclients and sexual relationships with clients. In contrast, In re Fuerst226
considers whether Louisiana lawyers can be disciplined for having
consensual sexual relationships with prospective clients and former
clients. It also considers whether a conflict of interest arising out of a
consensual sexual relationship with a client should be imputed to the other
lawyers at the firm.
According to the reported decision, attorney Randy Fuerst, a family
law practitioner, had “consensual sexual relationships with six women
who had at one time either retained his services or consulted with him
regarding their divorce cases. With one exception, these sexual
relationships did not occur while the attorney-client relationship was
ongoing.”227 The ODC filed formal charges, alleging that Fuerst’s
relationships violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct: Rules 1.7(a)(2) (a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest wherein there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or
third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer), 1.8(b) (a
lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation of
a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives
informed consent), 1.10 (imputation of conflicts of interest), 2.1
(in representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice), and 8.4(d)
(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).228
The hearing committee and the disciplinary board both concluded that
Fuerst had engaged in misconduct only with respect to one of the
individuals, a person identified as “MRW.” Fuerst had represented her in
divorce proceedings. According to the reported opinion, after the
representation had commenced, and “[d]uring the six-month waiting
period to file the rule to show cause why the divorce should not be granted,

226. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569.
227. Id. at 571.
228. Id. at 572.
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respondent and MRW engaged in a sexual relationship.”229 Since MRW
was a client at the relevant time, the hearing committee concluded that
Fuerst had violated Rules 1.7(a) and 8.4(d). The disciplinary board agreed
but found that Fuerst had violated Rule 2.1 as well. Although the client
had not been actually harmed by the relationship with Fuerst, the board
indicated that the “the risk for harm was great.”230 In light of the decisions
this Article considered earlier, these outcomes are not surprising. The only
element that seems to depart somewhat from recent Louisiana
jurisprudential treatment is the conclusion that Fuerst had violated Rule
8.4(d), the rule about conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The court had articulated that theory of misconduct in Ashy.231 But, as this
Article has discussed, it did not receive much attention in later Louisiana
sexual misconduct cases.232
When the case came before the Louisiana Supreme Court, it concluded
that the evidence supported the finding of the hearing committee and the
disciplinary board that Fuerst had “committed attorney misconduct by
engaging in a sexual relationship with a current client, MRW.”233 The
court did not cite any of the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to
this conclusion.
However, the ODC contended that Fuerst had engaged in additional
acts of misconduct. In particular, the ODC argued that “the ethical
prohibitions against attorney-client sexual relationships should be
extended to former clients, and should likewise apply in instances in which
the lawyer has been consulted by a prospective client but no attorney-client
relationship is ultimately formed.”234 The court characterized this as a
matter of first impression. After considering the ODC’s contention, the
court ended up rejecting it, stating, without further elaboration, “We find
229. Id. at 571. There is language in the opinion that suggests that the initial
sexual encounter between Fuerst and MRW might have alone been enough to
have violated the rules, at least in the view of the hearing committee. Id. at 573–
74. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not discuss that in its opinion; it
referred to the “sexual relationship” between MRW and Fuerst. Id. at 571. For its
part, the disciplinary board had noted, in its opinion, that the sexual relationship
had gone on for “about four months.” See In re Fuerst, 12-DB-042, p. 8 (La. Atty.
Disc. Bd. 2014), https://www.ladb.org/DR/Default.aspx?DocID=8179&TAB=
search&lname=fuerst [https://perma.cc/87PS-QWBK].
230. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 576.
231. See In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859, 867–68 (La. 1998).
232. Justice Weimer also referenced Rule 8.4(d) in his concurring opinion in
Fuerst. See In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 579–80 (Weimer, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 577.
234. Id.
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no support for this position in the Rules of Professional Conduct.”235 It
concluded, then, that Fuerst had not engaged in professional misconduct
by having consensual sexual relationships with persons who were either
prospective or former clients.
Two justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court saw things differently.
Justice Knoll and Justice Weimer concurred in the ultimate result in the
case,236 but they were of the view that a consensual sexual relationship
with a former client was problematic, or at least that it could be. In her
concurring opinion, Justice Knoll said, among other things:
When a sexual relationship arises during the course of the
representation, immediate termination of the attorney-client
relationship is a mandatory step in ameliorating the harm to the
client’s legal interests. However, termination does not entirely
eliminate the lawyer’s ethical obligations to his now former client.
Rather, as shown by Rule 1.9, an attorney has continuing duties
toward former clients which do not cease merely because the
professional relationship has ended.237
Articulating a broad notion of the duties of an attorney to a former
client, Justice Knoll said that “the attorney must continue to act in a way
so as not to actively harm the former client’s best interests even after the
professional relationship ceases.”238 As applied to the present case, she
said that Fuerst
235. Id.
236. The result was a six-month suspension, with three months conditionally
deferred.
237. Id. at 578. As this Article previously noted, when discussing Ryland,
Justice Knoll seems to have been of the view that immediate termination of the
attorney-client relationship is required when a sexual relationship arises during
the course of the representation.
238. Id. at 579. This expression of a lawyer’s duty to a former client is broader
than the one set forth in Rule 1.9 itself. The Rules of Professional Conduct treat
former clients differently than current clients. For example, Rule 1.7, which deals
with conflicts of interest, and Rule 2.1, which requires independent professional
judgment, have been relevant to a number of the Louisiana sexual misconduct
cases we have considered. However, both of those rules articulate duties owed to
“clients.” Rule 1.9, on the other hand, is a rule that articulates duties owed to
“former clients.” Setting aside aspects of Rule 1.9 that deal with lawyers who
move from one law firm to another, Rule 1.9 incorporates three main prohibitions:
(1) a prohibition against using information relating to the representation of the
former client to the disadvantage of the former client; (2) a prohibition against
revealing information relating to the representation of the former client; and (3) a
prohibition against representing another person in the same matter that was
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had a duty to refrain from entering into a sexual relationship with
his former clients until the underlying proceedings are concluded.
By failing to do so, respondent has placed his personal interests
ahead of his professional obligations. He has potentially
jeopardized his clients’ legal matters and burdened them by
forcing them to find new legal representation.239
Justice Weimer agreed. But he also said that
an attorney’s duty to refrain from entering into a sexual
relationship with a former client stems from the prohibition
against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, as
described in Rule 8.4(d). This duty would terminate when the
underlying proceedings are concluded or when the sexual
relationship would pose no adverse legal consequences to the
client.240
This is an expansive understanding of Rule 8.4(d),241 one that
apparently was not shared by the majority in Fuerst.
Returning to the majority opinion in Fuerst, we should note something
else about the court’s discussion of the prospective-client and formerclient issues. As phrased by the court, the question was whether “the
ethical prohibitions against attorney-client sexual relationships should be
extended to former clients, and should likewise apply in instances in which
the lawyer has been consulted by a prospective client but no attorney-client
relationship is ultimately formed.”242 It seems significant that the court
involved in the representation of the former client, or in a matter substantially
related to it, when the interests of the other person and the former client are
materially adverse. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9 (2018). The third
prohibition, which can be considered a conflict of interest prohibition, is much
narrower than the conflict of interest prohibitions in Rule 1.7.
239. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 579 (Knoll, J., concurring).
240. Id.
241. Justice Weimer added:
[T]he proscription against conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice most often applies to litigation-related
misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Harrington, 585 So.2d 514,
520 n.4 (La.1990) (citing examples). However, Rule 8.4(d) also reaches
conduct that is uncivil, undignified, or unprofessional, regardless of
whether it is directly connected to a legal proceeding.
Id. at 579–80. This Article mentioned some problems with this view of Rule
8.4(d) in supra note 117.
242. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 577.
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referred to “the ethical prohibitions against attorney-client sexual
relationships.”243 The expression seems to confirm something that we
mentioned earlier: by this point in the development of Louisiana sexual
misconduct cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court had come to see sexual
relationships between attorneys and clients as being subject to
“prohibitions.”244
There was another issue in Fuerst: imputed disqualification. Fuerst
filed a divorce petition on behalf of a person identified in the opinion as
“MLDG.” After the attorney-client relationship had commenced, MLDG
expressed an interest in dating Fuerst. He told her that he could not date a
client. She responded by informing Fuerst that she would obtain another
attorney. Fuerst referred her to another lawyer in the firm with which
Fuerst was associated—in an “of counsel” capacity—and filed a motion
to withdraw. After Fuerst had withdrawn, Fuerst and MLDG commenced
a consensual sexual relationship that persisted for several years. In the later
disciplinary proceedings, MLDG testified that her relationship with Fuerst
had been “positive and beneficial to her.”245
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the sexual relationship
between Fuerst and MLDG gave rise to an imputed conflict of interest
under Rule 1.10. This is a rule that provides, among other things:
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9,
unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the
prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of
materially limiting the representation of the client by the
remaining lawyers in the firm.246
The court said this about the application of the rule:

243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. This is not necessarily the same as saying that all sexual relationships
between attorneys and their clients are prohibited. For example, the court has not
indicated that it would violate professional standards for a lawyer to represent his
or her own spouse in legal matters. If that issue were to arise, it is possible that
the court would conclude, as did the drafters of Model Rule 1.8(j), that the
prohibition against sexual relations with clients should not apply to pre-existing
sexual relationships. However, it possible for a lawyer who represents the
lawyer’s spouse to have a conflict of interest. The issue is discussed in infra text
accompanying note 281.
245. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 574.
246. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.10(a) (2018).
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Although respondent’s sexual relationship with MLDG does not
constitute misconduct [presumably because the client terminated
his representation of her before commencing the sexual
relationship with him], we do find that he violated Rule 1.10 by
referring her legal matter to another lawyer in the law firm with
which he was associated as “Of Counsel.” A lawyer who is “Of
Counsel” to a law firm is considered to be a member of the firm
for purposes of analyzing imputed disqualification questions . . . .
After respondent was discharged by MLDG, he was required to
refer her divorce case to a lawyer outside his law firm prior to the
time that he became involved in a personal relationship with
her.247
The court thought that Fuerst’s sexual relationship with MLDG gave
rise to a conflict of interest that was imputed to the other lawyers at the
firm. In terms of the language of Rule 1.10 itself, the analysis would
appear to go something like this: Fuerst, practicing alone, would have been
prohibited from representing MLDG in the divorce case at the same time
that he was having a sexual relationship with her; because he would have
been prohibited from so representing her, the other lawyers in the firm
were also prohibited from “knowingly” representing her during the
pendency of the sexual relationship between Fuerst and MLDG; therefore,
Fuerst should not have referred the matter to another lawyer in the firm.
This seems like a rather dubious conclusion in light of the actual
language of Rule 1.10(a), quoted above. It is reasonable enough to
conclude that a sexual relationship with a client gives rise to a conflict of
interest under Rule 1.7. Several Louisiana decisions, including In re
Ryland, have said so. The problem with the court’s analysis is that it does
not consider the exception mentioned in the rule. That is, it does not deal
with the portion of Rule 1.10(a) that states: “unless the prohibition is based
on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a
significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the
remaining lawyers in the firm.”248 If anything counts as a “personal
interest” of the lawyer, a sexual relationship between the lawyer and
another person would seem to qualify. If that is so, there would be no
conflict of interest to impute to the firm unless the “personal
interest . . . present[s] a significant risk of materially limiting the
representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.”249 As
applied to Fuerst, the question would be whether there was a significant
247. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d at 577.
248. LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.10(a) (2018).
249. Id.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 162

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LOUISIANA LAWYERS

835

risk that Fuerst’s sexual relationship with MLDG would materially limit
the work of other firm lawyers on MLDG’s divorce case. If there was such
a risk, it is not identified in the opinion. In the absence of such a risk, there
should have been no imputed disqualification.250
Nonetheless, the court concluded that there had been a violation of
Rule 1.10, and that Fuerst had violated it. In light of that, and the separate
conflict of interest involving MRW, the court ordered a six-month
suspension, three months deferred, on condition that Fuerst engage in no
additional misconduct.
If the imputed disqualification issue in Fuerst had arisen under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, instead of under the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct, the imputed disqualification issue would
have been handled differently. That issue, at least in the first instance,
would have been dealt with under Model Rule 1.8(k), which states, “While
lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs
(a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.”251
The imputation cuts off at subpart (i) of Model Rule 1.8; that is, it does not
pick up the prohibition against sexual relations with clients found in
subpart (j) of Model Rule 1.8. On this point, a comment to Model Rule 1.8
states: “The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not
applied to associated lawyers.”252 In Fuerst, the Louisiana Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion.
There is one other matter to mention. Fuerst told his client, MLDG,
that he could not date a client, so MLDG elected to terminate the lawyerclient relationship with him in order to engage in a sexual relationship with
him. Assuming that the actions taken by Fuerst and MLDG had been
sufficient to make MLDG a former client, and assuming that Fuerst had
250. An imputation rule for sexual relationships could be somewhat unwieldy.
Would lawyers be expected to enter information about their sexual relationships into
the conflicts database for their law firms? See Moss & Chamblin, supra note 20, at
51. On the other hand, it has been argued that imputation could be helpful in some
instances. See Vincent, supra note 18, at 679; see also Alberto Bernabe, Coming
Soon to a Law Practice Near You: The New (and Improved?) Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 691, 716–17 (2008) (arguing that
“problems arise regardless of whether the rule imputes the conflict to the firm”).
251. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(k) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
252. Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 20. It should be noted, though, that the ABA Model Rules
include the same imputed disqualification concept in Model Rule 1.10(a) that is
found in Louisiana Rule 1.10(a). If there were to be a situation in which the sexual
relationship between a law firm lawyer and a law firm client could “present a
significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the
remaining lawyers in the firm,” an imputation of the sexual-relationship conflict
of interest might be imputed under that rule.
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not referred her to another lawyer in his law firm—and thus had avoided
the imputed disqualification problem addressed by the court—then, absent
other factors, it appears that Fuerst would have been able to engage in the
sexual relationship with MLDG without running afoul of professional
standards. As mentioned earlier, the court concluded that “the ethical
prohibitions against attorney-client sexual relationships” did not extend to
former clients.253 More to the point, the court actually said that Fuerst’s
sexual relationship with MLDG did “not constitute misconduct.”254 If
Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect in Louisiana at the relevant time, it
appears that Fuerst could have been able to avoid a Rule 1.8(j) violation
by ending the attorney-client relationship before commencing the sexual
relationship. Model Rule 1.8(j), by its terms, refers to clients. It is part of
Model Rule 1.8, the title of which is “Conflict of Interest: Current Clients:
Specific Rules”.255 Former clients are covered by another rule.256 So this
likely would have worked under the Model Rules, as well.257
III. SHOULD LOUISIANA RECONSIDER ADOPTION OF MODEL RULE
1.8(J)?
Louisiana lawyers have been subject to professional discipline for a
variety of sexually related conduct. As discussed in the foregoing sections
of this Article, the Louisiana Supreme Court has disciplined them for: (1)
engaging in criminally related sexual conduct, regardless of whether the
victims were clients or nonclients; (2) sexually harassing a client or a
nonclient; (3) attempting to coerce a client into providing sexual favors or

253. In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569, 577 (La. 2014) (per curiam).
254. Id.
255. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The
Louisiana version of Rule 1.8 has the same title. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 1.8 (2018).
256. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9 (2018).
257. Some commentators have suggested that this would have been
permissible. See Awad, supra note 18, at 191 (arguing that states “should adopt
express rules that prohibit attorney-client sexual relations during representation”;
if such a rule is in place, an attorney who wishes to enter into a romantic or sexual
relationship with a client, need only “refer the client to a colleague or other
attorney before commencing the romantic or sexual relationship”); Livingston,
supra note 20, at 63 (arguing that the rules should prohibit lawyers from initiating
sexual relationships with clients during the period of representation; however,
“[i]f both parties wish to pursue a sexual relationship immediately, lawyers can
arrange for competent substitute counsel and can end the professional
relationship”).

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 164

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LOUISIANA LAWYERS

837

attempting to engage in sexual relations with the client; and (4) entering
into a consensual sexual relationship with a client.
Although Louisiana lawyers are generally not subject to discipline for
having consensual sexual relationships with prospective clients or former
clients, according to Fuerst, they are apparently subject to discipline under
an imputed disqualification theory if they terminate representation of a
client, arrange to have the client represented by another lawyer in the same
law firm, and then commence a consensual sexual relationship with the
person the lawyer used to represent.
In In re Bordelon,258 a lawyer’s sexually related conduct did not give
rise to a violation of professional standards. The attorney in that case had
a consensual sexual relationship with a nonclient.259 In all of the other
cases this Article has discussed, the lawyer’s sexually related conduct gave
rise to violations of applicable professional standards, on one theory or
another.
Given this state of affairs, we might renew the question that was asked,
and answered in the negative, in connection with the work of the Louisiana
Ethics 2000 Committee: Should the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct be amended to incorporate Model Rule 1.8(j)?260 One way to
begin to answer that question would be to consider whether the sexual
misconduct cases we have considered might have come out differently if
Rule 1.8(j) had been in place at the relevant time.
A. Would Model Rule 1.8(j) Have Made a Difference in Louisiana’s
Sexual Misconduct Cases?
The criminal cases involving lawyer sexual misconduct almost
certainly would not have been decided differently if Model Rule 1.8(j) had
been in place at the time. In the first place, most of the criminal cases
involved victims who were nonclients. Because Model Rule 1.8(j) focuses
on sexual relations with clients, it simply would not have been applicable
to most of them. However, in In re Hammond, the lawyer did engage,
directly or indirectly, in sexually related acts involving some clients, and
258. In re Bordelon, 894 So. 2d 315 (La. 2005) (per curiam).
259. Id. The court did not discipline the attorney for the sexual relationship
with the nonclient, but the court did discipline the attorney for making false
statements in the disciplinary proceedings regarding the payment of a loan.
260. The timing might be good. One commentator recently stated: “The need to
re-examine the rules relating to sexual relationships between attorneys and clients
is especially pertinent today, given some of the high-profile sexual harassment and
assault cases that have come to the public’s attention as a part of the #MeToo social
media campaign and other efforts.” Baker, supra note 4, at 245.
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the Louisiana Supreme Court permanently disbarred him. Depending on
the definition of “sexual relations”, the attorney’s sexual assaults on his
clients could have been found to violate Rule 1.8(j). However, the serious
criminality of Hammond’s sexually related conduct would probably have
been the main focus of attention. And there is no professional sanction
more severe than the one that the court imposed.
Some of the noncriminal cases discussed earlier could be considered
sexual harassment cases. In a couple of those cases, the Louisiana Supreme
Court disciplined lawyers for engaging in sexual harassment of nonclients.
Inasmuch as Rule 1.8(j) deals with sexual relations with clients, it would
not have applied to them.
This Article also discussed instances in which lawyers were subject to
professional discipline for engaging in sexual harassment of clients. For
example, in In re Ashy,261 the lawyer made sexually related comments to
his client and attempted to coerce her into having sexual relations with
him. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the attorney had
violated Rules 1.7, 2.1, and 8.4. If Model Rule 1.8(j) had been in effect at
the time, the Louisiana Supreme Court might have concluded that Ashy
had attempted to violate that rule by attempting to have sexual relations
with his client, thereby running afoul of Rule 8.4(a), which prohibits
lawyers from attempting to violate one of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. This would have been an indirect application of Rule 1.8(j). But
it is not likely that the outcome would have been different in that case,
given the court’s serious treatment of the sexual misconduct issue and its
conclusion that the lawyer’s sexually related conduct had violated several
rules.
The other sexual harassment case that is relevant here is In re
Johnson.262 There, the lawyer showed his client “lewd photographs” and
made “suggestive sexual comments to her.” The court characterized the
lawyer’s conduct as involving a conflict of interest. The reported decision
does not detail the content of the “comments.” But if they did not involve
a request for sexual favors or an attempt to get them, it is unlikely that
Model Rule 1.8(j) would have been applicable, even indirectly. However,
even if the facts could have supported an indirect application of the rule,
it is not likely that the end result would have been different. In re Johnson
was a reciprocal discipline case, and the usual outcome is to impose the
same discipline as in the first jurisdiction.263

261. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859 (La. 1999) (per curiam).
262. In re Johnson, 177 So. 3d 116 (La. 2015) (per curiam).
263. See id. at 119.
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This Article considered additional noncriminal cases in which lawyers
tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to coerce their clients into providing
sexual favors or into having sexual relations. If Rule 1.8(j) had been in
effect, those cases might have been analyzed differently. As noted above
with respect to Ashy, instead of, or in addition to, finding a conflict of
interest under Rule 1.7 or an impairment of the lawyer’s professional
judgment under Rule 2.1, the Louisiana Supreme Court might have found
that the lawyers had attempted to violate Rule 1.8(j) and had thereby
violated Rule 8.4(a). Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the court would
have considered the lawyers’ misconduct to have been more reprehensible,
or more deserving of serious discipline, than the court actually did in those
cases.
Model Rule 1.8(j) would not have applied to In re Bordelon,264 the
case in which an attorney had a consensual sexual relationship with a
nonclient. The rule’s prohibition against sexual relations is limited to
clients.
The cases in which lawyers did enter into consensual sexual
relationships with clients are cases to which Model Rule 1.8(j) would have
been applicable, if it had been in effect at the relevant time. In these cases,
the court could simply have concluded that the lawyers had engaged in
sexual relations with clients and had thereby violated the clear prohibition
of the rule. The court would not have needed to refer to other rules, at least
for the sexual misconduct elements of those cases.265 However, as we saw
when discussing the consensual sexual relationship with client cases, the
court was able to discipline the lawyers under existing rules. So, while the
analysis in these cases likely would have been different if Model Rule
1.8(j) had been in place, it is not obvious that application of the rule would
have yielded different outcomes in the end.
In re Fuerst, the one Louisiana case in which the court disciplined a
lawyer under an imputed disqualification theory for sexually related
conduct, could have been decided differently—on the imputed
disqualification issue—if, in adopting Model Rule 1.8(j), the court would
also have adopted the language from Model Rule 1.8(k) indicating that
conflicts of interest arising under Model Rule 1.8(j) are not imputed to
other lawyers at the firm. Absent other factors, the application of that
language likely would have led to the conclusion that Fuerst did not violate
264. In re Bordelon, 894 So. 2d 315 (La. 2005) (per curiam).
265. Whether the sanctions would have been different is a different question.
For now, we should simply note that once a lawyer is found to have committed a
violation of one of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a number of factors can be
relevant to the determination of the appropriate sanction. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX
§10(C) (2019) (factors to be considered in imposing sanctions).
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the Rules of Professional Conduct by entering into a sexual relationship
with a client he had previously referred to another lawyer in the firm.
However, inasmuch as the court also disciplined Fuerst for entering into a
sexual relationship with another client, while she continued to be a client,
it is not obvious that the disciplinary outcome would have been different
in the end.
The other teaching of the Fuerst case—that prohibitions against sexual
relationships between lawyers and clients do not apply to former clients or
prospective clients—likely would have come out the same way, because
Model Rule 1.8(j) does not say anything about sexual relationships with
former clients or prospective clients, and the title to Model Rule 1.8 is
“Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules.”266
This exercise of attempting to discern whether adoption of Model Rule
1.8(j) would have made a difference in the decided Louisiana sexual
misconduct cases does not, by itself, indicate that the case for adoption is
a particularly compelling one. However, there are some additional
considerations. Some of these suggest the wisdom of adopting Model Rule
1.8(j). Others suggest the reverse.
B. Additional Considerations
1. Considerations in Favor of Adoption
The reported Louisiana sexual misconduct cases do not deal with all
of the issues relating to lawyer sexual misconduct involving clients. There
are additional issues that have not yet arisen for which Model Rule 1.8(j)
could offer some assistance. One of these is whether a Louisiana lawyer
could have a conflict of interest in representing the lawyer’s own spouse,
or another person with whom the lawyer already has a committed sexual
relationship.267 Model Rule 1.8(j) expressly excludes pre-existing existing
sexual relationships from the scope of the rule, so any uncertainty on that
point would be diminished by the adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j).268
On a related point, it should be noted that, so far, the Louisiana cases
have not endeavored to draw a clear distinction between consensual sexual
266. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The title
to Louisiana Rule 1.8 is the same. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 (2018).
267. The issue has received some attention in the literature. See, e.g., Sande L.
Buhai, Emotional Conflicts: Impaired Dispassionate Representation of Family
Members, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1159, 1174–75 (2008).
268. This Article uses “diminished” instead of “eliminated” because adoption
of the rule would not eliminate the possibility of a conflict of interest connected
with a pre-existing sexual relationship. See infra note 281.
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relationships that precede the representation and consensual sexual
relationships that follow it. Some language in DeFrancesch, dealing with
the emotional attachment arising from a sexual relationship, might be
relevant to a lawyer-client sexual relationship case regardless of the
whether the sexual relationship was in place before the attorney-client
relationship commenced.269 But the American Bar Association has taken
the position that “[i]ssues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary
relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual
relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer
relationship.”270 Assuming that the Louisiana Supreme Court wished to
treat pre-existing sexual relationships more leniently than ones that
commence after formation of the lawyer-client relationship, it could do so
by adopting Model Rule 1.8(j).
So far, the Louisiana cases do not appear to have featured a situation
in which the attorney commenced a sexual relationship with an agent or
representative of an organizational client. However, as noted previously in
this Article, a comment to Model Rule 1.8 has something to say about this:
When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule
prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or
outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a
constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or
regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s
legal matters.271
The idea is that a lawyer’s sexual relationship with an agent of the
client who supervises, directs, or regularly consults with the lawyer about
the client’s legal matters could impair the representation of the client.
Although this is one of those situations in which the Model Rules have
included a substantive rule in a comment,272 if the Louisiana Supreme
Court were disposed to adopt the provision, it could always make it part
of the text of its version of Rule 1.8(j).273 Adoption would give guidance
to lawyers on an issue that the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet
addressed.

269. In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71, 76–77 (La. 2004) (per curiam).
270. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
271. See id. r. 1.8 cmt. 19.
272. I have discussed the problem elsewhere. See N. Gregory Smith, Missed
Opportunities: Louisiana’s Version of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 61 LA.
L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2000).
273. Some states have done this. See Stilley, supra note 4, at 512–25.
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Adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) would close the door on a potential
informed-consent argument. Given the current state of Louisiana law on
sexual relations between lawyers and clients, a lawyer who is charged with
a conflict of interest for having sexual relations with a client might attempt
to argue that the sexual relations were permissible because of the informed
consent of the client. That is, the lawyer might attempt to show that, before
the lawyer entered into sexual relations with a client, the lawyer obtained
the client’s informed consent to a continuation of the representation, in
compliance with the conflict of interest waiver provisions set forth in Rule
1.7(b). However, some commentators,274 and one of the comments to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,275 question whether a client
can actually give informed consent in this situation. Adoption of Model
Rule 1.8(j) would preclude the informed-consent argument, at least in the
case in which there is no pre-existing sexual relationship between the
lawyer and the client, because, under the rule, the conflict of interest would
be non-consentable.
Adoption of the rule would also send a message. It would send a
message that Louisiana lawyers engage in professional misconduct if they
have sexual relations with their clients, unless the lawyer and the client
were already involved in a consensual sexual relationship before the
attorney-client relationship commenced.276 Adoption might deter lawyers
from commencing sexual relations with their clients, thereby avoiding the
harms that the rule was intended to address. It could also provide a
standard for clients, letting them know whether their lawyer would violate
ethical obligations by having sexual relations with them.277
In addition, adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) would be a step in the
direction of legal uniformity. Louisiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct
largely track the black letter rules in the American Bar Association’s

274. See supra note 189.
275. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCt r. 1.8 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
276. “Messaging” was one of the reasons for the promulgation of Model Rule
1.8(j). See supra text accompanying note 10; see also Feiser, supra note 21, at 54
(“For some legal scholars, the primary benefit of such bright-line rules is that they
would put attorneys on clear notice that severe discipline awaits if they engage in
any sexual conduct with clients, thereby protecting the integrity of the legal
profession by providing a shield from the inherent, serious risks in such
relationships.”); Seymore, supra note 191, at 219 (adoption of an explicit
prohibition against attorneys representing clients with whom they have a sexual
relationship “sends an important message about valuing women’s voices and
makes explicit that sex with clients is unethical, exploitative, and harmful”).
277. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Many other states have adopted the
rule.278 Louisiana could join them.
Finally, as one writer put it, even though “black letter prohibitions like
Model Rule 1.8(j) are not perfect, . . . the profession should not allow the
perfect to be the enemy of the good.”279 Moreover,
[e]ven if Model Rule 1.8(j) is not the ideal “disciplinary floor,”
with some innocuous attorney conduct prohibited and some bad
behavior permitted, the proper response is to build a better floor—
not completely remove it. To that end, Model Rule 1.8(j) serves
as a baseline that states can build upon and improve based on
experience.280
2. Considerations Against Adoption
There are some contrary arguments. In the first place, it is evident from
the reported decisions that the Louisiana Supreme Court has been able to
discipline lawyers for sexually related conduct under the existing rules.
Many of those cases would not have been covered by Rule 1.8(j) even if
it had been in place. In addition, in the cases involving sexual relations
with existing clients—cases to which Rule 1.8(j) would have been
applicable—the lawyers were subject to discipline anyway, based on the
circumstances present in those cases. Because the court has managed to
deal with lawyer sexual misconduct in the absence of Rule 1.8(j), the case
for its adoption may not be all that strong.
It is true that Rule 1.8(j) deals with an issue that has not yet come
before the court: whether a lawyer might be subject to discipline for
representing the lawyer’s own spouse, or some other person with whom
the lawyer has a pre-existing sexual relationship. Adoption of Rule 1.8(j)
would indicate that the lawyer could indeed undertake such representation,
because of the exception for pre-existing sexual relationships articulated
in the rule. But adoption of the rule might also give rise to
misunderstanding. Although the language of 1.8(j) might cause some
lawyers to think that it is not a problem to represent a person with whom
the lawyer has a pre-existing sexual relationship, that is not necessarily so.
In a given instance, the lawyer’s emotional attachment arising out of a preexisting relationship could interfere with the quality of the representation,
278. See Baker, supra note 4, at 253; Stilley, supra note 4, at 499, 512–25
(including a table showing different approaches taken in different jurisdictions);
see also Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts, supra note 4.
279. Baker, supra note 4, at 258.
280. Id. (footnote omitted).
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giving rise to a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7, or an impairment of
professional judgment under Rule 2.1.281 In a situation like this, the bright
line rule of 1.8(j) might misleadingly render other client-protection
standards less apparent.282 Adopting a clarifying rule that seems to indicate
that pre-existing sexual relationships are not a problem might not bring the
hoped-for clarity.
The contention that Rule 1.8(j) would close the door on an informedconsent argument is a strong one only to the extent that the door should be
closed. Rule 1.8(j) is a one-size-fits-all kind of proposition. In the cases in
which it applies—cases in which lawyers have sexual relations with
existing clients—it allows for no consideration of individual
circumstances or informed consent arrangements. Many conflicts of
interest can be resolved with the informed consent of the client, if some
conditions can be satisfied.283 It might be quite difficult to satisfy the
conditions. It might be difficult for the lawyer to show that the client was
truly able to give informed consent. But to close the door altogether does
not allow for those possibilities. Different circumstances may justify
different outcomes, or so it has been argued.284
281. A 1992 ABA ethics opinion acknowledged that “[a] sexual relationship
predating the professional relationship could, in some circumstances, raise the
same ethical problems as are here considered.” ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro.
Resp., Formal Op. 92-364, n.1 (1992). But the opinion went on to say that the
likelihood of the problems “should be considerably less when the sexual
relationship predates the professional one.” Id. A number of commentators have
expressed the concern that problems can arise regardless of whether the sexual
relationship preceded the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g, Bernabe, supra
note 250, at 717; Bower & Stern, supra note 21, at 544–45; Feiser, supra note 21,
at 80; see also Buhai, supra note 267 (arguing that emotional conflicts can
interfere with representation and that lawyers should be required to take emotional
conflicts into account before representing anyone with whom they have emotional
or family ties, including spouses).
282. See Seymore, supra note 191, at 219–21 (the existence of the exclusion
for pre-existing sexual relationships “stands as tacit approval for representing
sexual intimates”). One of the comments to Model Rule 1.8 suggests that a preexisting sexual relationship with a client might still give rise to a conflict of
interest. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983). However, the comment is much less prominent than Model Rule 1.8(j)
itself.
283. See LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (2018).
284. See, e.g., Bower & Stern, supra note 21, at 541 (“A rule that bars all
sexual relationships is far too simplistic to account for all the intricacies of human
interactions.”); William K. Shirey, Dealing with the Profession’s “Dirty Little
Secret”: A Proposal for Regulating Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 13 GEO. J.
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The argument in favor of adopting an express rule, like the one set
forth in the comments to Model Rule 1.8, that prohibits sexual relations
with some representatives of organizational clients, might not be very
strong. Rule 1.7 already deals with impairments to the representation
caused by the personal interests of the lawyer. That kind of impairment is
what the rule on sexual relations with representatives of organizations is
trying to avoid. In that respect, an additional rule may be unnecessary. In
addition, representatives of organizational clients might need less
individual protection from sexually connected invitations by lawyers for
their organizations than do the vulnerable clients that appear in some of
the reported sexual misconduct cases.285 The matter of a lawyer having
sexual relations with the representative of an organizational client has not
yet arisen in Louisiana. If it were to arise, there is little reason to think that
the Louisiana Supreme Court would lack the legal tools to deal with it.
The argument that adoption of the rule would send a clear message to
lawyers is not free from doubt. As noted earlier, there is the possibility that
adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) could cause misunderstanding with respect
to the representation of spouses or other persons with whom lawyers might
have committed sexual relationships. There is also a definitional issue.
Rule 1.8(j) does not define “sexual relations.” In the absence of a
definition, a lawyer might think that the expression refers only to sexual
intercourse, even though other forms of sexual behavior involving clients
might give rise to the same kinds of risks that the rule is intended to
prevent.286 On the other hand, one could construe “sexual relations” to
LEGAL ETHICS 131 (1999) (“[A]ny regulation by the bar of attorney-client sexual
relations must account for the complex variety of relationships that can and do
exist between attorneys and their clients.”); Jennifer L. Myers et al., To Regulate
or Not to Regulate Attorney-Client Sex? The Ethical Question in Pennsylvania,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 763–64 (1996) (“[W]ithin each specific relationship there
will be diversity because every case is unique.”); see also Feiser, supra note 21,
at 79 (“[P]er se bans do not show enough respect for the choices that many women
make, giving short shrift to the fact that women may be capable of choosing how
to conduct their private lives.”); Buckner & Sall, supra note 20, at 41 (“Imposing
on lawyers a blanket prohibition on sexual relations with clients is a statement
that lawyers and clients who become sexual partners cannot act as adults in their
interpersonal relations and must instead be told ‘no,’ like children.”).
285. See Herrin, supra note 21, at 308 (arguing that ban on sexual relations
should not apply to representatives of corporations, because the nature of the
attorney-client relationship in that context is “a far cry from the type of powerimbalanced relationship that the rule contemplates”).
286. See Feiser, supra note 21, at 80 (“Nor does it make sense to fail to define
the term ‘sexual relationship,’ possibly leaving the door open to one-time sexual
encounters or other forms of coercion that pose the same dangers as actual sexual
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encompass other forms of sexual behavior, perhaps including “sexting,”
that might not be well-suited for a per se rule.287 Whatever types of conduct
one might construe the rule to cover, there is also the question of whether
“sexual relations” should be understood to apply to a single instance of
that conduct or whether it should be understood to apply only to repeated
instances of that conduct.288 If one of the purposes of Model Rule 1.8(j) is
to send a clear message to lawyers that would guide their behavior toward
clients, the rule, at least in this respect, might be seen to fall somewhat
short.
In the absence of Model Rule 1.8(j), disciplinary authorities who were
required to consider a complaint about the sexually related conduct of a
lawyer would not need to struggle with whether or not the conduct came
within the definition of “sexual relations.” They would instead focus on
whether the conduct in question created a conflict of interest under Rule
1.7; impaired the independent professional judgment of the lawyer, in
violation of Rule 2.1; or ran afoul of some other rule, such as Rule 8.4(b).
relationships.”); Seymore, supra note 191, at 221 (“[T]he rule ought, for the sake
of clarity and completeness, to include a definition of sexual relationship. It is not
helpful in the grievance process if a lawyer can argue that nothing short of vaginal
intercourse constitutes a sexual relationship.”). The case of In re Peters, 959 So.
2d 846 (La. 2007) (per curiam), which this Article has not mentioned elsewhere,
seems relevant here. In that case, a Louisiana lawyer had a romantic interest in a
client whom he was representing in a divorce. Although the hearing committee
found that Peters “did not have an intimate relationship” with the client while he
represented her, “he did have personal feelings for her.” Id. at 855. Peters admitted
that, “on one occasion, there was ‘a sexual encounter’ which was ‘physical in a
sexual sense;’” however, the client “denied that her relationship with respondent
went beyond kissing at a Christmas party.” Id. at 851 n.4. The committee believed
that his feelings for the client “clouded his judgment” and caused Peters to fail to
inform her of her husband’s desire for reconciliation. Id. at 855. For the conflict
of interest and other misconduct, Peters was suspended from the practice of law
for three years.
287. “Sexting” has been treated differently in different jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stout, 451 P.3d 155 (Okla. 2019) (instance of
sexual intercourse with a client violated Rule 1.8(j), but instances of sexting with
clients were subject to Rule 1.7); In re Stanton, 376 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2016)
(sexting and physical touching short of sexual intercourse were found to violate
Alaska Rule 1.8(j)); Disciplinary Couns. v. Detweiler, 989 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2013)
(per curiam) (lawyer who engaged in sexting with client found to have violated
Ohio’s version of Rule 1.8(j), which prohibits lawyers from soliciting or engaging
in sexual activity with a client); see also Dane S. Ciolino, Is Sexting ‘Sex’?, LA.
LETHAL ETHICS (Mar. 21, 2020), https://lalegalethics.org/is-sexting-sex/
[https://perma.cc/GF3K-G6XJ] (sexting should not count as “sex”).
288. See Feiser, supra note 21, at 80.
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Under this approach, for example, “sexting” would not constitute a per se
violation of professional standards, but it could be disciplinable if it gave
rise to a violation one of the existing Rules of Professional Conduct. This
approach is the same one that the Louisiana Supreme Court has been using
to deal with the lawyer sexual conduct cases that have come before it, with
considerable success.
The separate contention that adoption of the rule would send a
message to lawyers and their clients that lawyer sexual misconduct will
not be tolerated would be less persuasive if one were to conclude that the
message has already been sent. The cases that this Article has discussed
should already alert Louisiana lawyers to the dangers of inappropriate
sexually related conduct, criminal or otherwise. Some of those cases
involve consensual sexual relations with clients, which is the situation
targeted by Model Rule 1.8(j). The disciplinary outcomes in those cases
constitute messages that lawyers should heed.
Maybe Louisiana lawyers would get the message better if it were
included in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct instead of being
articulated in published opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
However, lawyers who do not pay much attention to published opinions
in which attorneys are disciplined for sexual misconduct might not pay
much attention to the language of the Rules of Professional Conduct.289
Even if Louisiana were to adopt Model Rule 1.8(j), its inclusion as one of
the many unlabeled subparts to Rule 1.8 might not be very obvious to a
lawyer who lacks familiarity with the codified rules. However, as a
practical matter, a Louisiana lawyer who is unsure about the propriety of
having sexual relations with a client could find out about that rather
quickly using the Internet.290

289. On a related note, one commentator has stated that, based on his review
of the cases in which jurisdictions have adopted per se bans, the “outright bans or
near-outright bans” on sexual relationships with clients are not deterring the major
problems. Feiser, supra note 21, at 56. Of course, it is possible that incidents of
sexual misconduct would have been greater in those jurisdictions in the absence
of the bans.
290. As a simple experiment, on July 15, 2020, I did a Google search for “Sex
with clients Louisiana.” The first three results included information about either
Ashy or Fuerst, both of which would be helpful on this issue. The second entry
was to a blog posting by Professor Dane Ciolino that included these words in the
title: “Sex with Clients is Verboten.” See Dane S. Ciolino, Sex with Clients Is
Verboten. What About Sex with Former Clients and Prospective Clients? LA.
LEGAL ETHICS, https://lalegalethics.org/sex-clients-verboten-sex-former-clientsprospective-clients/ [https://perma.cc/3M2U-XHAA] (July 15, 2020).

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 175

4/26/21 8:53 AM

848

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

It might be easier for clients to find out what the Rules of Professional
Conduct say about lawyer sexual misconduct than to find out what cases
say about it. However, clients who are concerned about the behavior of
their lawyers might simply contact the ODC. As a practical matter, though,
a Louisiana client who wants to find out whether lawyers can get into
trouble for having sexual relations with their clients could probably come
up with an answer pretty quickly using a web browser.291
Uniformity of rules may be a good thing, but it is not likely to be
achieved in this area of the law. Louisiana is not the only state not to have
adopted Model Rule 1.8(j).292 Some states that have adopted it have
incorporated additional elements.293 Still other states have adopted rather
different rules.294 And, as evidenced by the promulgation of Model Rule
1.8(j) itself, the ABA changes its model rules from time to time. In a future
day, it might even change Model Rule 1.8(j). Uniformity could be hard to
come by. In any event, if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to adopt a
new rule, rather than attempting to achieve uniformity, it could make some
sense to for the court to attempt to fashion the best rule possible. The state
variations in rules dealing with lawyer sexual misconduct could offer an
opportunity to improve on the ABA’s model.
C. Some State Variations
If the Louisiana Supreme Court were disposed to add a rule on sexual
relations with clients, it could certainly adopt Model Rule 1.8(j) as is. But
there are other options. Although many states have adopted Model Rule
1.8(j),295 some states have fashioned rules on lawyer sexual misconduct
that are different from the ABA’s model.296 Some of these variations might
be regarded as superior to the ABA’s model, at least in some respects. We
should consider some of them.

291. See id.
292. See Baker, supra note 4, at 253; Stilley, supra note 4, at 499, 512–25
(including a table showing different approaches taken in different jurisdictions);
see also Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts, supra note 4.
293. See supra note 292.
294. See supra note 292.
295. See supra note 292.
296. See Baker, supra note 4, at 243, 253–57 (discussing state variations);
Stilley, supra note 4, at 512–25 (including a table showing jurisdiction-byjurisdiction approaches).
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1. Oklahoma
Some states have adopted Model Rule 1.8(j) but have added additional
provisions to it. Oklahoma’s rule provides an example: “A lawyer shall
not have sexual relations with a client unless: (1) a consensual sexual
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship
commenced and (2) the relationship does not result in a violation of Rule
1.7(a)(2).”297 The second exception signals that a pre-existing sexual
relationship can still give rise to a conflict of interest. The reference to
Rule 1.7(a)(2) is to the Oklahoma rule that generally prohibits a lawyer
from representing a client when there is a significant risk that the
representation will be materially limited by, among other things, a
personal interest of the lawyer.298 A sexual relationship with a client could
qualify as a “personal interest.”
This Article earlier noted that one of the arguments against adoption
of Model Rule 1.8(j) is that it could cause misunderstanding.299 The
language of Model Rule 1.8(j) might cause some lawyers to think that it is
not a problem to represent a person with whom the lawyer already has an
existing sexual relationship. However, it is possible that, in a given
instance, the lawyer’s emotional attachment relating to an existing sexual
relationship could interfere with the quality of the representation, giving
rise to a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7, or an impairment of
professional judgment under Rule 2.1. The Oklahoma variation helps
avoid that misunderstanding.
2. Ohio
Ohio’s version of Rule 1.8(j), while succinct, departs from the ABA
model in a couple of respects: “A lawyer shall not solicit or engage in
sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed
between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”300 The
rule prohibits “sexual activity,” which is a broader expression than “sexual
relations.” In a 2013 case, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that the
prohibition was broad enough to cover “sexting.” 301

297. OKLA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (2008).
298. Id. r. 1.7(a)(2).
299. See supra text accompanying note 281.
300. OHIO RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (2020).
301. In a 2013 case, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that the prohibition was
broad enough to cover “sexting.” See Disciplinary Couns. v. Detweiler, 989
N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2013) (per curiam).
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The Ohio rule also prohibits solicitation of such activity. The antisolicitation provision, while potentially helpful on messaging, might not
be all that consequential from a disciplinary perspective, because Ohio
Rule 8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate
or attempt to violate the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.”302
Solicitation of sexual activity with a client could be seen as an attempt to
violate the rule against engaging in sexual activity with a client.
3. Washington
Washington’s version of Rule 1.8(j) appears to build on the ABA
model, but it incorporates several additional features. It states, in part:
A lawyer shall not: (1) have sexual relations with a current client
of the lawyer unless a consensual sexual relationship existed
between them at the time the client-lawyer relationship
commenced; or (2) have sexual relations with a representative of
a current client if the sexual relations would, or would likely,
damage or prejudice the client in the representation.303
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have a comment that
applies Model Rule 1.8(j) to some constituents of client organizations,304
but the Washington rule integrates a provision about client representatives
into the black letter provisions of the rule. However, the Washington
provision on representatives is substantively different from the ABA’s. It
is broader, in one respect, because it covers all representatives of clients,
whereas the ABA version applies only when the client is an organization,
and it focuses on constituents of the organization who supervise, direct, or
regularly consult with the lawyer concerning the organization’s legal
matters.305 On the other hand, where the ABA provision applies, it is a
bright-line affair; in contrast, the Washington provision engages when
sexual relations with the representative “would, or would likely, damage
or prejudice the client in the representation.”
The Washington rule also includes a definitional provision. It states
that “[f]or purposes of Rule 1.8(j), ‘lawyer’ means any lawyer who assists
in the representation of the client, but does not include other firm members

302.
303.
304.
1983).
305.
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who provide no such assistance.”306 A comment explains that this
provision “specifies that the prohibition applies with equal force to any
lawyer who assists in the representation of the client, but the prohibition
expressly does not apply to other members of a firm who have not assisted
in the representation.”307 Lawyers at the firm who do not provide legal
assistance to the client are therefore not barred from engaging in sexual
relations with the firm’s client. The exclusion is in addition to
Washington’s Rule 1.8(k),308 which, like the corresponding provision of
the ABA model rule,309 excludes Rule 1.8(j) itself from the general rule
about imputing conflicts of interests of individual lawyers to the other
lawyers at the firm.
Washington’s rule uses two expressions that are departures from the
comparable language of the ABA model rule. One is a reference to “at the
time,” rather than “when,” when referring to the point at which the
prohibition applies. This departure may not be all that consequential, but
it might tend to make it a bit clearer that the exception to the rule applies
only when there is an existing sexual relationship already in place at the
time that the representation commences.
The other expression is “current.” The Washington rule focuses the
ban on sexual relations with “current” clients, clearly indicating that the
rule does not apply to former clients. As we saw, that was an issue in
Fuerst.310 However, the inclusion of “current,” while clarifying, may not
be all that necessary, because the title to Washington Rule 1.8 is “Conflict
of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules.”311
4. Minnesota
Minnesota adopted a rule on sexual relations with clients before the
promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j).312 Like the Washington rule, the
current Minnesota rule, identified as Rule 1.8(j) of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct, incorporates several elements not included in the
ABA model:
(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
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client-lawyer relationship commenced. For purposes of this
paragraph: (1) “sexual relations” means sexual intercourse or any
other intentional touching of the intimate parts of a person or
causing the person to touch the intimate parts of the lawyer; (2) if
the client is an organization, any individual who oversees the
representation and gives instructions to the lawyer on behalf of the
organization shall be deemed to be the client; in-house attorneys
while representing governmental or corporate entities are
governed by Rule 1.7 rather than by this rule with respect to sexual
relations with other employees of the entity they represent; (3) this
paragraph does not prohibit a lawyer from engaging in sexual
relations with a client of the lawyer’s firm provided that the lawyer
has no involvement in the performance of the legal work for the
client; (4) if a party other than the client alleges violation of this
paragraph, and the complaint is not summarily dismissed, the
Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, in
determining whether to investigate the allegation and whether to
charge any violation based on the allegations, shall consider the
client’s statement regarding whether the client would be unduly
burdened by the investigation or charge.313
Earlier, we noted that the absence of a definition of “sexual relations”
in Model Rule 1.8(j) could give rise to some concerns.314 The Minnesota
rule includes a definition. The definition picks up both intimate touching
by the lawyer and lawyer-caused intimate touching of the lawyer by the
client.315
The Minnesota rule includes a provision about organizational clients
that departs from the ABA model in a couple of respects. First, in contrast
to the ABA approach, the Minnesota provision, like the comparable
provision in Washington, is incorporated into the text of the rule, rather
than being relegated to a comment. Second, rather than referring to “a
constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly
313. MINN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (2019).
314. See supra text accompanying note 286.
315. The Oregon rule does the same but adds another element. The relevant
Oregon provision states:
For purposes of this rule: "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or
any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing
such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the lawyer for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either
party . . . .
OR. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (2020).
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consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s legal matters,”316
the Minnesota version covers “any individual who oversees the
representation and gives instructions to the lawyer on behalf of the
organization.” In further contrast to the ABA version, the Minnesota
provision excludes in-house attorneys from the scope of the rule. They are
subject to Rule 1.7, the basic conflict of interest rule, instead.
Like the Washington rule, the Minnesota rule creates an exception for
other lawyers at the firm who are not providing legal services to the client.
This exception is in addition to Minnesota Rule 1.8(k),317 which, like the
corresponding provision of the ABA Model Rules,318 excludes Rule 1.8(j)
itself from the general rule about imputing conflicts of interests of
individual lawyers to the other lawyers at the firm.
Finally, the Minnesota version of the rule includes a provision
designed to protect the interests of clients when anyone other than the
client alleges that the lawyer has violated the sexual misconduct rule.
Unless the complaint is summarily dismissed, the Minnesota disciplinary
agency is required to consider whether investigation of the claim or filing
a charge related to the claim would unduly burden the client.
5. California
California was the first state to adopt an express rule on attorney-client
sexual relations,319 but its rule has not been static.320 The current rule, Rule
1.8.10 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, is titled “Sexual
Relations with Current Client.” It states:
(a) A lawyer shall not engage in sexual relations with a current
316. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8, cmt. 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
317. MINN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(k) (2019).
318. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(k) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
319. See Awad, supra note 18, at 137–38.
320. See New Rules of Professional Conduct Effective November 1, THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News/News-Releases/
new-rules-of-professional-conduct-effective-november-1 [https://perma.cc/T6JP
-VSUN] (last visited August 7, 2020) (stating that some 70 new and amended
rules became effective on November 1, 2018, including a stricter rule against sex
with clients); Neil J. Wertlieb, The Disruptive and Controversial New Rules,
DAILY JOURNAL: CALIFORNIA LAWYER, https://www.dailyjournal.com/mcle/288
[https://perma.cc/4A38-4FAZ] (last visited August 7, 2020) (saying that the new
rule represents a “major shift” and that the revising commission had “concluded
that the current rule had not worked as intended – evidenced by the fact that in the
25 years since the rule’s adoption, there had been virtually no successful
disciplinary prosecutions” under it).
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client who is not the lawyer’s spouse or registered domestic
partner, unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between
them when the lawyer-client relationship commenced.
(b) For purposes of this rule, “sexual relations” means sexual
intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person*
for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(c) If a person* other than the client alleges a violation of this rule,
no Notice of Disciplinary Charges may be filed by the State Bar
against a lawyer under this rule until the State Bar has attempted
to obtain the client’s statement regarding, and has considered,
whether the client would be unduly burdened by further
investigation or a charge.321
Like the Washington rule, the California rule makes it clear that the
prohibition against sexual relations applies to “current” clients, which
would exclude former clients from the scope of the rule.
The California rule excludes the lawyer’s spouse or registered
domestic partner from the scope of the rule. Inasmuch as the rule also
excludes pre-existing sexual relationships, this language might have rather
limited applicability. But it does highlight the two specifically identified
exclusions.
Like the Minnesota rule, California’s rule includes a definition of
“sexual relations,” but it is not the same definition. Minnesota’s definition
makes it clear that “sexual relations” includes lawyer-induced intimate
touching of the lawyer by the client. The California rule differs in another
way as well—it adds a purpose element to the definition.
Like the Minnesota rule, the California version of the sexual
misconduct rule includes a provision offering protection to the interests of
the client when someone other than the client alleges a violation of the
rule. There are some procedural differences between the protective
provisions, but their aim is the same.
6. Iowa
Iowa is another jurisdiction that adopted a rule on lawyer-client sexual
relations before the promulgation of Model Rule 1.8(j).322 Iowa’s current
rule, Rule 32:1.8(j) of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, includes
some elements that we have seen before, but it also offers something new:
321. CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8.10 (2020). The asterisks indicate
that “person” is defined in the “Terminology” portion of the rules. See id.
r. 1.0.1(g-1).
322. See Awad, supra note 18, at 139–40.
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A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client, or a
representative of a client, unless the person is the spouse of the
lawyer or the sexual relationship predates the initiation of the
client-lawyer relationship. Even in these provisionally exempt
relationships, the lawyer should strictly scrutinize the lawyer’s
behavior for any conflicts of interest to determine if any harm may
result to the client or to the representation. If there is any
reasonable possibility that the legal representation of the client
may be impaired, or the client harmed by the continuation of the
sexual relationship, the lawyer should immediately withdraw from
the legal representation.323
Like some of the other rules this Article has considered, the Iowa rule
reaches representatives of clients; however, unlike the ABA version, the
Iowa rule does not qualify the word “representative” in a way that limits
its application to constituents of client organizations who oversee or direct
the representation. In this respect, it is like the comparable Washington
provision; however, unlike that provision, there is no limiting language
about damage or prejudice to the client. It has a broad sweep.
Iowa’s rule, like California’s, includes an exception for spouses.
Unlike California’s rule, however, it does not include an exception for
domestic partners.
The new element is the rule’s characterization of the exemptions for
spouses and pre-existing sexual relationships as “provisionally exempt.”
The Iowa rule expressly requires the lawyer to consider whether there
might still be a conflict of interest in one of these situations and whether
any harm might come to the client or the representation as a result.
Moreover, the rule says that “the lawyer should immediately withdraw
from the legal representation” if there is “any reasonable possibility” that
the representation may be impaired, or the client harmed, if the sexual
relationship continues.
7. Alabama
The Alabama rule on sexual misconduct is quite different from the
others we have considered. Alabama Rule 1.8 has two subparts that work
together:
(l) A lawyer shall not engage in sexual conduct with a client or
representative of a client that exploits or adversely affects the
interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship, including,
323. IOWA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 32:1.8(j) (2020).
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but not limited to: (1) requiring or demanding sexual relations
with a client or a representative of a client incident to or as a
condition of legal representation; (2) continuing to represent a
client if the lawyer’s sexual relations with the client or the
representative of the client cause the lawyer to render incompetent
representation.
(m) Except for a spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that
existed at the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship,
sexual relations between the lawyer and the client shall be
presumed to be exploitive. This presumption is rebuttable.324
Subpart (l) prohibits “sexual conduct,” by the lawyer, which is a
broader expression than “sexual relations.” However, instead of
articulating a flat ban, the Alabama rule applies only to sexual conduct that
exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the attorney-client
relationship. The rule gives examples of prohibited conduct, including
demanding sexual relations as a condition of legal representation, but the
scope of the rule is not limited to the stated examples.
The protected “interests” of the client are not spelled out. Presumably,
they would include those that are involved in the representation. But the
client could have other interests as well, including physical, psychological,
or spiritual interests, that could be affected by sexual relations with a
lawyer. The reach of the expression is not clear from the language of the
rule.
The Alabama rule, like others already mentioned, expressly applies to
representatives of clients. Like the Iowa rule, the Alabama rule does not
qualify the word “representative” in a way that limits its application to
constituents of client organizations who oversee or direct the
representation. However, the provision about representatives is also
subject to the limitation about sexual conduct that exploits or adversely
affects the interests of the client or the attorney-client relationship.
Subpart (m) provides that, except for spousal relationships and sexual
relationships that existed at the commencement of the attorney-client
relationship, “sexual relations”325 between the attorney and the client
“shall be presumed to be exploitive.” The presumption is rebuttable. But
spousal relationships and pre-existing sexual relationships do not appear
to be altogether free from the prohibition in subpart (l); instead, they

324. ALA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(l) & (m) (2008).
325. The expression “sexual relations” seems narrower than the earlier
reference to “sexual conduct.”
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appear to be free from the presumption that they are exploitive.326 On this
reading, for example, a pre-existing sexual relationship that exploited the
interests of the client would still violate the rule.
8. Florida
Florida is another jurisdiction that adopted a sexual misconduct rule
before the ABA promulgated Model Rule 1.8(j).327 The current version of
the rule is different in both structure and substance from the from the ABA
model. Structurally, it is located in Florida’s misconduct rule, Rule 48.4,328 instead of being located in Florida’s equivalent of Rule 1.8.329
Substantively, it is closer to Alabama’s rule than to Model Rule 1.8(j).
Like the rule in Alabama, the Florida rule on sexual misconduct
eschews a per se approach and focuses on particular harms to be prevented.
It provides, in part: “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in sexual conduct with
a client or a representative of a client that exploits or adversely affects the
interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship.”330 These are the
same harms that are referenced in the Alabama rule. Moreover, consistent
with the Alabama rule, the Florida rule uses “sexual conduct” instead of
“sexual relations” as the focus of the rule’s prohibition. Like the Alabama
rule, the Florida rule does not expressly limit the “interests” of the client
that are protected by the rule.331
The Florida rule, like Alabama’s, incorporates a presumption, but uses
different words to express it:
If the sexual conduct commenced after the lawyer-client
relationship was formed it shall be presumed that the sexual
326. On a related note, a comment to the Alabama rule states that “before
proceeding with the representation” in a situation in which there is a spousal
relationship or a sexual relationship that pre-dates the attorney-client relationship,
“the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer’s ability to represent the client
will be materially limited by the relationship.” ALABAMA RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. Sexual Relations Between Lawyer and Client (2008).
327. See Awad, supra note 18, at 138–39.
328. See FLA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-8.4 (2020).
329. See id. r. 4-1.8.
330. Id. r. 4-8.4(i).
331. However, the comments to the Florida rule state, in part: “The lawyerclient relationship is grounded on mutual trust. A sexual relationship that exploits
that trust compromises the lawyer-client relationship. Attorneys have a duty to
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of clients. Engaging in
sexual relationships with clients has the capacity to impair the exercise of that
judgment.” Id. r. 4–8.4 cmt.
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conduct exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or
the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer may rebut this
presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the sexual conduct did not exploit or adversely affect the interests
of the client or the lawyer-client relationship.332
This provision does not, like Alabama’s, explicitly refer to a “spousal
relationship.” However, like the comparable Alabama provision, it
indicates that the presumption does not apply to sexual conduct333 that
preceded the formation of the attorney-client relationship. The Florida rule
also explains how the presumption may be overcome.
The Florida rule includes a provision, like the ones in Washington and
Minnesota, that excludes lawyers in the same firm who do not provide
legal services to the client:
The prohibition and presumption stated in this rule do not apply
to a lawyer in the same firm as another lawyer representing the
client if the lawyer involved in the sexual conduct does not
personally provide legal services to the client and is screened from
access to the file concerning the legal representation.334
According to this provision, lawyers who do not “personally” provide
legal services to the client are not prohibited from engaging in sexual
conduct with the client. However, they have to be “screened from access
to the file concerning the representation.” The file access screening
requirement is new. The other rule variations referenced in this part of the
Article did not include it.
9. A Comment on the Variations
This discussion of sexual misconduct rules in different jurisdictions,
while not exhaustive, demonstrates that there is considerable variety
among those rules.335 Among the variations are ones that adopt the ABA
model rule but add provisions to it; adopt a per se ban that is different from
the one in Model Rule 1.8(j); and adopt a rule that is not a per se ban, but
332. Id.
333. I noted, above, that the Alabama rule used a narrower “sexual relations”
expression in describing the presumption.
334. FLA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(i) (2020).
335. There are other variations as well. For a survey of the different rules, see
Stilley, supra note 4, at 512–25. See also Baker, supra note 4, at 353–57
(discussing different rules in different jurisdictions); Jurisdictional Rules
Comparison Charts, supra note 4.
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that instead prohibits sexual conduct by lawyers that causes particular
harms.
Some of the state rules that depart from Model Rule 1.8(j) have
features that one could regard as improvements on the ABA model.
Among these are definitions of “sexual relations”; black letter provisions
that deal with sexual relations between lawyers and representatives of
organizational clients; and provisions that make it clear that, even in the
case in which the lawyer has a pre-existing sexual relationship with the
client, sexual relations with the client can still give rise to a conflict of
interest.
If, at some point, Louisiana were to reconsider its earlier decision not
to add an explicit rule about sexual misconduct to the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct, there would be a number of “models” that it could
consider.
CONCLUSION
Written rules are teachers. Adding an explicit rule to the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct that prohibits lawyers from engaging in
sexual relations with clients could be good for the Louisiana legal
profession and for the clients served by Louisiana lawyers.
If the Louisiana Supreme Court were to add a rule on sexual relations
with clients to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, it could take
advantage of some of the state variations we have seen and create a rule
that might be better than Model Rule 1.8(j). For example, if the court chose
to adopt a per se ban on initiating sexual relations with existing clients, the
court could devise a rule that includes: (1) a definition of “sexual
relations”; (2) a provision on the application of the rule when the client is
an organization, like a corporation; and (3) a provision making it clear that,
when a lawyer takes on the representation of a person with whom the
lawyer has a pre-existing sexual relationship, the lawyer is still subject to
the basic conflict of interest rule on personal interests of the lawyer that
materially impair the representation of the client.336
It might also be beneficial to adopt a provision, like those in California
and Minnesota, that require disciplinary authorities to consider the
336. Even more broadly, the court could adopt a provision stating that the
lawyer is still subject to the other rules relating to the lawyer’s responsibilities to
the client. Either approach should be adequate to deal with the concern, apparently
shared by the several members of Louisiana’s Ethics 2000 Committee, that
adoption of Model Rule 1.8(j) “could serve as a safe-harbor sheltering lawyers
engaged in sexual conduct that is inappropriate.” See supra discussion
accompanying note 31.
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potential harm to the client caused by the disciplinary process itself, if the
complaint about the lawyer’s sexual misconduct comes from someone
other than the client. In addition, it might be somewhat helpful to
incorporate a provision, like that included in the Washington rule,
indicating that the exception to the rule for pre-existing sexual
relationships applies only when the pre-existing sexual relationship is still
in place at the time that the representation commences.
Alternatively, the court could consider adopting a rule, more like
Alabama’s or Florida’s, that does not feature a per se ban but instead
focuses on sexual conduct by the lawyer that exploits clients, adversely
affects the interests of clients, or adversely affects the lawyer-client
relationship. This type of rule would have a potentially broad scope but
would apply only when the conduct causes one of the specified harms.
Such a rule could be more difficult to administer than a per se rule, because
there would need to be a showing that the sexual conduct caused one of
the harms contemplated by the rule,337 but that might not be much
different, in practice, from what the Louisiana Supreme Court has been
doing in sexual misconduct cases that have come before it. In the
noncriminal cases, the court has primarily been looking to see whether the
conduct created a conflict of interest or impaired the independent
professional judgment of the lawyer. Those are the kinds of harms that
should be covered by a rule of this type. Even if this approach were taken,
the court could incorporate some of the additional provisions mentioned
above that have been developed in other jurisdictions.
If the court were inclined to reconsider the imputed disqualification
rule it articulated in Fuerst, it could take the approach reflected in Model
Rule 1.8(k) and exclude the sexual misconduct rule from the general
imputation provision found in Rule 1.8. Under this approach, the rule
would prohibit an individual lawyer who engages in sexual relations with
a client from representing that client, but it would not automatically bar
the other lawyers in the firm from doing so. Even so, they would still need
to pay attention to Rule 1.10(a). Under that rule, if the sexual relationship
between the individual lawyer and the client were to “present a significant
risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining
lawyers in the firm,” the conflict of interest would still be imputed to the
other lawyers in the firm. In the event that the court were inclined to depart
from the Fuerst approach to imputed disqualification, it might also
consider adoption of a provision, like ones found in several of the state
337. Incorporation of an evidentiary presumption, like the ones set forth in the
Alabama and the Florida rules, might mitigate the difficulty in administering the
rule.
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variations, that excludes lawyers in the firm who do not provide legal
services to the affected client.
Sometimes, delay can be a good thing. By not acting earlier to adopt
Model Rule 1.8(j), the Louisiana Supreme Court is in a position to take
advantage of lessons learned and rules developed by other jurisdictions.
However, lawyer sexual misconduct can take many forms. As
demonstrated in the reported Louisiana cases, it can arise out of criminal
sexual conduct involving clients or nonclients. It can arise out of
noncriminal, nonconsensual sexual conduct involving clients and
nonclients. And it can arise out of sexual relations with existing clients.
Model Rule 1.8(j) focuses only on sexual relations with clients. And it
focuses only on some of those—ones that do not involve a pre-existing
consensual sexual relationship between the lawyer and the client. If other
situations involving sexually related lawyer conduct do not require the
adoption of a specific sexual misconduct rule, perhaps the situation of
sexual relations with clients does not require one either. So far, the absence
of such a rule has not prevented the Louisiana Supreme Court from dealing
with the various instances of lawyer sexual misconduct that have come
before it. In any event, the difficulties of fashioning the right rule,
suggested both by the criticisms of Model Rule 1.8(j) and by the existence
of different sexual misconduct rules that have developed in different
jurisdictions, might incline the Louisiana Supreme Court to simply
continue to do what it has been doing, which is disciplining lawyers whose
sexual behavior runs afoul of existing rules.
In the meantime, Louisiana lawyers should be aware, from the
reported cases, that they may be disciplined for sexual conduct that
violates the criminal law, for sexual harassment of clients and nonclients,
for nonconsensual sexual conduct that breaches their fiduciary obligations
to clients, or for commencing consensual sexual relations with existing
clients. As to the latter point, we should recall that, based on the most
recent cases involving consensual sexual relationships with clients,
including consent discipline cases, it appears that the operative rule in
Louisiana is that a lawyer who engages in sexual relations with an existing
client will be found to have engaged in professional misconduct. Cases
can be teachers, too.
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